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What Nature wishes should be said, She'llfind the rightful voice to say! 1
From time immemorial war has visited its excesses on nature, 2 excesses that the Earth can
less and less afford. Are the armed forces that are intended to protect us from harm3 the very
agents of our ultimate destruction? In waging wars are we losing the planet?
In a world already troubled by stratospheric ozone depletion, global warming, rain forest
destruction, and myriad other local, regional, and transboundary environmental dangers,4 the
ecological depredations of the combatants in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially Kuwait, are further cause for great
concern.
5 Extensive chemical weapons use, habitat and species destruction, and oil and
William Winter, The Golden Silence, in The Shorter Bartletts Familiar Quotations 430
(Kathleen Sprout ed.. 1960). We neglect at our peril to heed Nature's call to action.
From ancient times to modern the environment has been used as a weapon and as a target of war. Fire and flood
are among the most prevalent examples, of which there are far too many to recount here. The Spartans salted
Athenian fields during the Peloponnesian War. The Dutch opened dikes to create a water barrier (the "Dutch
Water Line" of 1672) to halt the French in the Third Anglo-Dutch War. Both sides burned huge expanses of the
veldt during the Boer War. Verdun was emaciated by artillery and poisoned with gas during World War I. A
horrific loss of life and widespread devastation occurred when the Chinese dynamited the Huayuankow dike on the
Yellow River during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1938). The United States extensively seeded clouds over the
Ho Chi Minh Trail and defoliated large jungle tracts during the Vietnam War. See, e.g., Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy
AprRAiSAL 5-10 (Arthur H. Westing cd., 1984). Another chilling example is the contamination of Scotland's
Gniinard Island during Britain's Anthrax testing in 1942; the island remains uninhabitable today. Margaret T.
Okordudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian Gulf War: Legal Appraisal ofan Environmental Warfare. 23 St. Marys L.J.
123, 156 (1991). Even the earliest of the modern commentators on the law of war, including no less a figure than
the venerable Hugo Grotius, called for restraint in "(l)aying (w)aste" to things. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac
Pacis 745-56 (Kelscy trans., 1925). See also Geoffrey Best, The Historical Evolution ofCultural Norms Relating
to War and the Environment, in Cijt.ti.iraI- Norms. War .and the Environment 1 % et seq. (Arthur H. Westing
ed., 1988). The Huayuankow dike incident of 1938 probably ranks as the most infamous of all. In this incident
thousands of Japanese troops were killed but so were hundreds of thousands of Chinese. Millions were displaced
and millions of acres were devastated. Mark J. T. Caggiano. The Legitimacy ofEmironmental Destruction in
Modem Warfare: Customary Substance Ox'er Conventional Form, 20 B.C. Envtl Aff. L. Rev. 479. 489 n.73
(1993).
^Environmental protection, like self-defense, is a duty of government. See Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2. at 125.
See James T. McClymonds, Note, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An International Legal
Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. Sen. L. Rev. 583, 585 (1992). And see Michelle L. Schwartz, Natural Heritage
Institute, Preliminary Report on Legal and Institutional Aspects of the RelationshipBetween Human
Rights and the Environment 1-3 (1991).
^International armed conflict is itself a form of transboundary pollution. Military operations of all kinds create
pollution hazards which may be amplified by the introduction of substances and activities into areas that are

hazardous waste pollution are but a few of the adverse environmental impacts that occurred in the
Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia 6 Even today the full long-term health and
environmental effects of these (and prior) conflicts are not known and it is uncertain how long it
will take to acquire a complete understanding of how to remediate past and prevent future
occurrences.
7
The need to protect the environment against unjustified damage during armed conflict
glares ominously through the waning twilight of the 20th Century. Weapons of war grow ever
more virulent, greatly increasing the risk of harm to the environment from mere incidental
damage, to say nothing of the intentional destruction of the environment. Conventional weapons
of frightening destructive capacity proliferate unendingly while weapons of mass destruction,
despite significant legal restrictions, remain plentiful, some in new and untested hands. And
especially susceptible to environmental degradation. For example, the mere operation of armored vehicles in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq are believed to have had a significant impact on the reportedly fragile desert
ecosystem See Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 136. And see Virginia Morris, Protection of the Environment
in Wartime: The United Nations General Assembly Considers the Needfor a New Convention, 27 IntlLaw. 775,
776 n.5 (1993). The magnitude of the DESERT STORM waste management problem alone was enormous. See
Jeremy Leggett. The Environmental Impact of War: A Scientific Analysis and Greenpeace's Reaction, in
Environmental Protection and the Law of War 74 (Glen Plant ed., 1 992). Unexploded ordnance, especially
from submunitions, remains a major problem throughout this region, as in other theaters of war. See William M.
Arkin. The Environmental Threat of Military Operations 14-17 (Aug. 9. 1995) (paper presented to the September
1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and
Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S.
Naval War College, Newport. RI).
"To some, the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War was the first example of environmental warfare. For instance: "Until the
Persian Gulf Conflict, war and environmental damage arose independently, from time to time, as threats to our
survival." and "To the horror of the international community, the Persian Gulf Conflict brought about the
'marriage' of war and environmental damage and the "birth" of a new menace - deliberate wartime destruction of the
environment." Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challengesfor International
Law, 23 Cal. W. IntlL.J. 67, 68 (1992). The Gulf War brought the issue into sharp focus, but the practice of
environmental warfare is certainly not new. See supra note 2; see infra part II. A. 2.
The mysterious causes of "Gulf War Syndrome," for example; the undiscovered effects of "Yellow Rain" and
"Agent Orange." for others. See Bradley Graham & David Brown. U.S. Troops Were Near Toxic Blast in Gulf
Wash Post. Jun. 22, 1996. at Al ("Several blue-ribbon panels of scientists . . . have examined the issue and
concluded that there is no single explanation for [Gulf War Syndrome].").
See, e.g., Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposalfor
International Legal Reform, 29 Stan. J. IntlL. 165. 165-66 (1992).

ironically, the environment itself may be the most potent weapon of all, a weapon that can be
manipulated as easily by simple means as by technologically sophisticated ones. 9
To help stem the tide of environmental catastrophe in war, international law must be
strengthened and better enforced. 10 The question of how best to protect the environment during
armed conflict 11 received intense scrutiny following the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War ("Gulf War").
Compare, for example, the complexity involved in cloud seeding over Vietnam with the rank simplicity of the oil
well fires in Kuwait and the dumping of oil into the Persian Gulf. As to the former, an instance of hostile
environmental modification, see, generally. Arthur H. Westing, Ecological Consequences of the Second
Indochina War (1976). As to the latter, an instance of intentional environmental damage, see, e.g., Shilpi Gupta.
Note. Iraq's Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf. 6 Geo. Intl L. Rev. 251 (1993). N.B. Environmental
modification and environmental damage may be distinct but they are without any real difference. Environmental
modification like cloud seeding may be benign in its own right, causing only rain with no apparent long-term
damage to the atmosphere. The foreseeable effects of cloud seeding, however, may include long-term, widespread,
and severe environmental damage: torrential rains may cause excessive erosion which may have significant impact
on water quality throughout a watershed, which may have significant impact on the ability of all species, humans
included, to survive in that ecosystem.
The mainstream view in 20th Century international law, arising out of the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868
("(T)he progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating, as much as possible the calamities of war."), is
that armed conflict should be constrained by humanitarian considerations, i.e., that mitigation of the effects of
armed conflict is preferable to unrestricted warfare. Declaration Renouncing the Use, In Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, International Military Commission at St. Petersburg. Dec. 11,
1868 reprinted in Louis Henkin et al.. Basic Documents Supplement to InternationalLaw (Third Edition)
406 (3d ed. 1993). The opposing view is that unconditional war is its own best deterrent, that prospective
belligerents will seek to avoid the full horrors and destructiveness of war. In some respects, the theory of mutually
assured destruction (nuclear annihilation) operated successfully on this principle during most of the Cold War.
The corollary of the mainstream view is that restrained warfare is more likely for the very reason that prospectiv e
belligerents are at less risk. This, of course, is indeterminable. This paper shares the view that legal restraints on
armed conflict are beneficial and the best means by which to achieve the ultimate elimination of war. Protections
for the environment during armed conflict must be based on legal, not merely moral obligations. See Betsy Baker,
Legal Protectionsfor the Environment in Times ofArmed Conflict, 33 Va J. InttL. 351, 358 (1993). The
environment must be made part of the rationality calculus of the law of armed conflict. See Michael D. Diederich,
Jr., "Law of War" and Ecology: A Proposal For a Workable Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the
Law of War, 136 Mil. L. Rev. 137, 139 (1992).
1
'The harm with which this paper is concerned is that which results from military operations involving armed
conflict; excluded is enforcement of environmental standards and requirements during peacetime. Thus, whether
retrograde support for the overseas re-deployment of an armored division may incidentally involve a transboundary
movement of hazardous waste under the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel, 1989), U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG. 80-3 (1989), is beyond the scope of the paper,
while rear echelon defoliation for purposes of guerrilla suppression would not be. Also beyond the scope of the
paper, for example, is whether a combat-damaged ship would be liable for oily discharge into territorial waters of
the United Slates under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., while the intentional scuttling of a
chemical munitions ship in continental shelf fishing grounds would not be. And see infra note 382.

The importance of the matter is undiminished in a world rife with animosities that could boil over
anytime into armed conflict. 12
Among the most intractable problems, effective enforcement, long considered a weak
aspect of international law stands out. Two primary schools of thought have developed on how
to proceed. 13 One school holds that existing law is adequate and needs only better
implementation. 14 The other school holds that a new convention is needed.
"
Demands are now heard from many quarters for greater protection against and
accountability for wartime environmental damage. 16 For their part, states have begun to see
environmental protection, resource conservation, and sustainable development in strategic
terms. 17 The scope and complexity of many environmental issues, particularly those involving the
global commons, bring states ever closer to conflict in their competition for dwindling resources
and in their desire to protect themselves from environmental degradation caused by other states.
For individual states and the world community at-large, the stakes are rising.
1
2
Oil rich waters within the exclusive economic zones of several island groups - the Spratlys in the South China
Sea, Imia in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, and Abu Musa and other Iranian-occupied islands near
the Strait of Hormuz - are already sources of bitter controversy and the flexing of military muscle. Richard C.
Hottelet. Dangerous Isles: Even Barren Rocks Attract Attention, CHRISTIAN Sci. Monitor, Mar. 7. 1996, at 18.
1 There are numerous "camps" and "schools" described in the current literature with a variety of overt and subUe
distinctions. See, e.g., J. Ashley Roach The Laws of War and the Protection ofthe Environment, Envt &
Security J. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 8-9, on file with the author); Simonds, supra note 8, at 210 and
n.217 ("The debate following the Gulf War has divided most commentators into two camps: those who conclude
that the current framework of international law sufficiently protects the environment during war, and those who
propose enacting a new convention to govern environmental destruction during war." "The U.S. government falls
into this [first] camp." "The U.S. Department of Defense is concerned that specific rules prohibiting environmental
destruction could impair legitimate U.S. defense requirements . . . .").
_This school will be referred to as the "guidelines" approach. See infra part III.B.
l3This school will be referred to as the "new treat}" approach. See infra part II.E.
16
Leibler, supra note 6, at 117; and see Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 125. To say that peoples desire legal
reform is not to admit that states have committed themselves to it. It is typical in matters of the development of
legal rights that societal values congeal before legal principles evolve, and well before accordant state practice
commences.
17
See, e.g., Joseph C. Strasser, President's Notes, Naval War C. Rev., Winter 1995, at 4, 5. "Over the last
decade, enviroiunenlal degradation and resource scarcity have come to be perceived as threats not only to human
well-being and prosperity, but also to international security." Jutta Brunnee, Environmental Security In the
Twenty-first Century: New Momentum for the Development ofInternational Environmental Law, 18 FORDHAM
IntlL.J. 1742(1995).

Over the last quarter-century, two dramatic, largely unforeseen developments occurred:
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, resulting in the end of Cold War nuclear confrontation; 18 and,
the explosive growth of the corpusjuris of environmental law, both domestic and international. 19
These events, while seemingly unrelated, have combined to create conditions in which the world
community is better able, if not obliged, to refine and strengthen the law pertaining to
environmental protection during armed conflict. Regrettably, a consensus that it should be done
and a compelling impetus for it to be done do not equate to agreement on how to do it.
The sizable literature that has been written in this field over the last five years is focused
almost exclusively on the Gulf War and how the existing law of armed conflict20 is or is not
adequate to address the environmental calamity that occurred during the few months of that
relatively short regional conflict. While the GulfWar unquestionably provided ample incentive for
the conferences, symposia, intense scholarship, and prolific literature that followed, the work in
this field must be expanded beyond the law armed conflict and it must address itself to the most
difficult issue - enforcement. We must turn our attention, not away from the Gulf War, but to
armed conflict in a broader sense, especially armed conflict which is non-international. 21 We
1
8
Nuclear holocaust is the ultimate example of environmental damage in wartime. No other known form of
warfare comes close to the destructive potential previously inhering in a full nuclear exchange between the United
States and the former Soviet Union. While the legality of the possession and use of nuclear weapons is beyond the
scope of this paper, the legal restraints imposed on these weapons are salient to our considerations here.
Developments on the legal status of nuclear weapons should be monitored carefully.
See, e.g., Leibler, supra note 6, at 136-37.
2
In this paper, the term "law of armed conflict" will be used, interchangeably with the term "law of war." to
denote the body of international law, customary and conventional, pertaining to the use of armed force. The term
"humanitarian law" will be used to denote the body of international law, customary and conventional, pertaining to
the protection of persons and objects from the effects of armed conflict, i.e., primarily the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Additional Protocol thereto of 1977. While one might say that the former (the law of armed conflict)
is really only a part of the latter (humanitarian law), it will be helpful for our purposes to distinguish between the
two. As regards the term "law of armed conflict," one must also distinguish whether it is being used in the context
of thejus in bello (the law pertaining to the use of force during armed conflict) or thejus ad helium (the law
pertaining to the right to use force). See, e.g., Leibler, supra note 6, at 96-98. The law of armed conflict, or the
"Hague law," is distinguished by some from humanitarian law, or "the Geneva law." See Richard Falk, The
Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in Environmental Protection and the Law of War 83 (Glen
Planted., 1992). The Hague Regulations contain a number of humanitarian provisions. See Hague Regulations.
infra note 268.
2
'The prevailing view is that armed conflict of the future will occur on a regional or lower level and will be
conventional (as opposed to nuclear.) See, e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of

should keep in mind that future armed conflict may differ from the Gulf War as much as that
conflict differed from the Vietnam War. 22 The ultimate test of legal solutions, especially
enforcement mechanisms, is their ability to remedy ////predictable future events.
A broad and complex problem requires a comprehensive solution. A comprehensive
solution in this context must be interdisciplinary, a melding of the law of armed conflict,
humanitarian law, and international environmental law. 23 Too much of the work that has been
done in this field has been grounded exclusively or predominantly in only one, namely, the law of
armed conflict. 24 In this, the United Nations Decade of International Law, we need to forge a
partnership of "greens" (the environmental community) and "khaki" (the military).
The partnership of "greens" and "khaki" should adopt among its primary objectives the
attainment of effective means of enforcement of the law pertaining to environmental protection
during armed conflict. Of central importance is the role that armed forces will play. Should armed
force be used as an enforcement mechanism? And if so, when? And how? To fully analyze this
potentially drastic remedy, five questions must be answered. They are: Do we need a convention
the U.S. Armed Forces 2-4 (Joint Publication 1 1991); Charles R. Larson, Personal Reflections on the Use of
Military Force and Its Relevance to National Security Strategy, Naval War C. Rev., Spring 1995, at 83; Inis L.
Claude, Jr., The United States and Changing Approaches to National Security and World Order, Naval War C
Rev., Summer 1995, at 46.
22We must be continually vigilant to changes in the nature of warfare and its implications for the roles of
international law. security strategy, and the use of armed forces. See Colin S. Gray, The Changing Nature of
Warfare?, NAVAL War C. Rev., Spring 1996, at 7. See also Gupta, supra note 9, at 273.
iSee W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation ofthe International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent
Environment: The Expansion ofHuman Rights Norms, 3 Geo. IntlEnvtl. L. Rev. 85, 90 (1990).
^Characteristic of the dichotomy that exists here is the view that the law of armed conflict is "superior" to
international environmental law. See Bernard K. Schafer, The Relationship Between the International Laws of
Armed Conflict and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types ofConduct are Permissible
During Hostilities. 19 Cal. W. IntlL.J. 287, 319 (1989) ("In a time when state survival could always be
considered independently of human survival, the view was amply justified. That is not to suggest that state
survival and human survival are now inextricably linked, but they grow ever more so. The result is that the
traditional superiority of the law of armed conflict must be re-evaluated."). A similar problem has been
experienced with the law of armed conflict and humanitarian law. Consider the following: "It is common practice
to distinguish, and to treat as a separate subject, the humanitarian law applicable during hostilities." and "In fact,
the two bodies of law overlap and individuals in war and hostilities enjoy rights under the law of human rights."
Louis Henkin, et al, International Law 598 (3d ed. 1993). One of the themes in this paper is that synthesis,
not compartmentalization, of the law of armed conflict, humanitarian law, and international environmental law
pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict is imperative, especially if no new convention on
environmental protection during armed conflict is forthcoming.

relative to protection of the environment during armed conflict?; Are we likely to achieve such a
convention in the foreseeable future?; If not, then how can the law pertaining to environmental
protection during armed conflict be advanced in the meantime?; What is the existing law relative
to protection of the environment during armed conflict?; and, How can existing law be
strengthened and enforced? This paper answers these questions.
Part II
Do We Need A Convention Relative To Protection Of The Environment
During Armed Conflict?
In this part we will examine the impact of armed conflict on the environment. We will
observe that war is inherently destructive to the environment and that environmental destruction
will remain a certain consequence of armed conflict. We will briefly note the increasing
destructive capacity of modern weaponry and the declining carrying capacity of the Earth, that is,
the Earth's ability to absorb environmental catastrophe on a large scale. We will then explore
protection of the environment, the emerging right to a safe environment, and its corollary,
intergenerational equity. Having concluded that protection of the environment needs a legal
status commensurate with its importance to human survival, viz., that incidental protections are
not enough, we will discuss the need for a multilateral framework convention on environmental
protection during armed conflict and how the convention-protocol process might be used to
provide practical solutions to resolving complex and contentious issues. Finally, we will review
the Fifth Geneva Convention proposed by Greenpeace International.
A. The Impact ofArmed Conflict on the Environment
1 . War is Inherently Destructive to the Environment.
Environmental damage in wartime is inevitable.25 At present, war without damage and
destruction is inconceivable. 26 Take for instance this simple illustration: A high-explosive artillery
25\\;;William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. III. U.L.J. 299, 309 (1993) (quoting

round fired against an enemy missile battery in an orange grove, assuming that it lands on target,
will destroy or damage (pollute or partially destroy or injure in a physical sense) not only its
military target but some part of the surrounding area and its natural resources. The projectile and
its related components may introduce harmful substances into several media; combustion gases (at
the point of firing and at the point of impact) may introduce harmful substances into the air. A
variety of species {flora and fauna) may be killed or injured outright or as the result of habitat
modification, and the productive capacity of the grove will be diminished or destroyed. The
consequences magnify many fold when weapons of mass destruction are employed. 27
Environmental damage occurs with any adverse, incremental change in the existing status
of the environment. 28 What, then, is the "environment"? There are many definitions but none is
Antoine Bouvier, Protection ofthe Natural Environment in Time ofArmed Conflict, 285 Intl Rev. Red Cross
567, 569 (1991)). See also The American Society oflnternational Law, The Gulf War: Environment as a Weapon,
85 Am. Socy InteL. Proc 214, 220 (1991) (remarks of Sebia Hawkins)W Leggett, supra note 5, at 68.
^"Wilcox, supra note 25, at 3 10. "Protecting the environment during armed conflict is a particularly vexing
dilemma because of the inherent destructive nature of war." Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of
Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analvsis ofthe Persian Gulf War, 137 MlE. L. Rev. 1. 65
(1992).
1 Collateral environmental effects will be experienced with every type of weapon and munition with the possible
exception of lasers. The effects, of course, vary with the type of munition and the manner in which it is delivered.
Even the simple illustration used here points out the difficulty encountered in this area. For example, the same
missile battery could be destroyed by napalm bombs with far greater environmental damage almost assuredly
resulting. Napalm, of course, is not the weapon of choice in this scenario (see Plant, infra note 271
)
(Conventional Weapons Convention) and it puts a multi-million dollar aircraft and its highly-trained aircrew at
risk, but it is effective in its ability to disable or destroy the target. Less collateral environmental damage than
even the artillery strike would likely result if the missile battery were incapacitated by special forces action. This,
too. puts personnel at risk of injury, death, or capture. Does, or should, the law allow the special forces action or
the artillery strike but not napalm bombing? What if the only option reasonably available to the on-scene
commander was napalm? Wouldn't the commander still be justified in ordering destruction of the battery in order
to neutralize that deadly threat to his own forces? What if the battery was only a single hand-held anti-aircraft
missile launcher positioned atop a nuclear power plant? Would any attack on the battery that could breach the
integrity of the reactor be justified militarily compared with the potential harm that might occur? Questions, more
than answers, abound. Article 56 of Protocol I addresses attacks against facilities containing dangerous forces such
as nuclear power plants. See infra part V.B.2 . A series of five resolutions of the General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) condemns attacks on nuclear facilities. U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 45/58 J of Dec. 4, 1990, citing two of the IAEA resolutions, does also. See Plant, infra note 271.
2
°Sharp, supra note 26, at 32. Defining "environmental damage" is hardly less difficult than defining
"environment." Damage would certainly include injury or destruction in the physical sense, for example, trees
killed by herbicides, but it would also include pollution, another widely used but imprecise term. David Tolbert,
Defining the Environment, ' in Environmental Protection and THE Law OF War 258 (Glen Plant ed. , 1 992).

accepted universally. 29 One might define it as the sum total of the components and constituents
of the atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere. 30 Another definition is
that the environment is anything that is not man-made. 31
States have been reluctant to extend the definition of "environment" to such things as
natural resources, climate modification, biodiversity, and ecosystems for fear of limiting their
military options. 32 The definition of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality - "the natural and
physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment" 33 - illustrates the
problems of breadth, ambiguity, and circularity that plague this most basic concept, viz., what it is
we are attempting to protect. As will be seen in Part VI, however, the real controversy lies not in
defining "environment" but in establishing the threshold of environmental damage that will give
rise to a violation of international law. 34
2. Environmental Destruction Will Remain a Fixture of Armed Conflict.
Armed conflict will continue to produce environmental damage for the foreseeable
future. 35 While it may be true that technological advancements have brought us to the age of so-
29MichaeI A. Meyer, A Definition ofthe 'Environment, ' in Environmental Protection and the Law of War
255 (Glen Plant ed., 1992); Tolbert, supra note 28, at 257. Tolbert analogizes the difficulty of defining
"environment" with the difficulty of defining "pornography." One may know it when one sees it, but it's hard to
give a workable, yet all-encompassing definition. In this matter there are humanocentric as well as naturocentric
views, as there are with the definition of the right to a safe environment. Id. at 259; and see infra part II. C. 1.
^See Westing, supra note 2, at 3; Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2. at 144. This is the approach taken in the
ENMOD Treaty, art. II. See infra part V.C.5.
Sharp, supra note 26, at 32. The term "not man-made" would theoretically exclude genetically engineered or
improved species.
32Meyer, supra note 29, at 256; Tolbert, supra note 28, at 260.
3340C.F.R. § 1508.14.
J1+
Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I prohibit widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage, both
intentional and that which is reasonably foreseeable. It would seemingly be a high threshold, see Simonds. supra
note 8, at 174-75, but the standard was left purposefully undefined. Michael Bothe et al, New Rules for
Victims of Armed Conflict: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 346 (1982); and see Henry H. Almond, Jr., Weapons, War and the Environment, 3 Geo. Intl Envtl. L. Rev.
117, 130(1990).
Hopeful alternatives are "unarmed conflict" and "non-violent conflict resolution." As to the former, see Stephen
C. Neff, Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict: A Proposalfor a New International Law ofHostility. 28 Cornell
INTLL.J. 1 (1995). As to the latter, see Arthur H. Westing, Towards Non-Violent Conflict Resolution and
Environmental Protection: A Synthesis, in CULTURAL Norms, War AND THE Environment 151 et seq. (Arthur H.
Westing ed., 1988). Both of these concepts (in essence forms of compulsory and binding arbitration) depend on

called "smart" weapons,36 not every combatant has "smart" weapons in its arsenal and even those
powers with "smart" weapons may not use them exclusively. For example, in the Gulf War, the
United States mixed laser-guided bomb and missile attacks on Iraqi military installations with
"carpet bombing" of the Iraqi Republican Guard. The former were much reported on the nightly
television news; the latter was a much greater portion of the total ordnance expended in the air
campaign. 37 Despite significant advances, "surgical precision" in the delivery of weapons is not
yet the norm even among the best of modern armed forces. 38
In some cases, decidedly "low-tech" weapons such as contact naval mines remain militarily
useful and are plentiful. 39 They also have the advantage of being affordable by poor nations and
nations without the capability to employ sophisticated weapons systems. Other powerful "poor
man's" weapons include gas-enhanced explosives and biological and chemical weapons.40 As the
level of a weapon's sophistication decreases, the risk of collateral damage and injury to protected
objects and values increases.
states exercising a degree of self-restraint heretofore unknown. On the other hand, if the environmental
catastrophe happens that mam believe to be close-at-hand, then our crisis-driven legal systems may respond in
dramatic new ways, if it isn't by then too late, that is.
36The destructive power of a single stealth bomber strike (1 bomb) equals that of 95 B-52 raids (190 bombs)
during the Vietnam War and that of 4,500 B-17 raids (9,000 bombs) during World War II. Frank R. Finch, This
Land Is Our Land: The Environmental Threat of Army Operations 18 (Sept. 20, 1995) (paper presented to the
September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the Environment During Armed
Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare
Studies. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI).
3 Of the 88,500 tonnes dropped in total by the Coalition forces in the Gulf War, only 6,500 (7.4 per cent) were
precision-guided." Leggett, supra note 5, at 73. "A single B-52 bomber carrying 40 CBU-87/Bs [each of which
contain 202 individual bomblets]. can carpet-bomb 176 million square yards, or 27,500 football pitches. Twenty-
eight B-52s dropped 470 tonnes of these on 30 January 1991 alone; a quantity which could in principle have
obliterated 1,600 square miles, an area one-third the size of the state of Connecticut." Id. at 74.
See, e.g., John Mintz, High-Tech Weaponry Not Infallible: Israeli Use ofSystems Called Into Question, Wash.
Post, Apr. 19. 19%. at A33. Two American made computerized fire control systems, the "Firefinder" counter-
batter}' targeting system and the "Patriot" anti-missile defense system, have been used by the Israelis with success,
but their record of performance is by no means perfect, as evidenced in the case of the Firefinder by the killing of
90 refugees in the apparently inadvertent shelling of a U.N. compound in southern Lebanon. Id.
Recall the image of the supertanker Bridgton leading its U.S. Navy escorts through mine-infested waters of the
Persian Gulf during the 1980's "Tanker War." The irony of the protectors becoming the protected is all the more
powerful when one considers how great a threat was posed by World War II-vintage mines and how easily and
quickly the Iranians laid them.
The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and last year's bombing of the Oklahoma City federal
building are two frightening examples of the crude simplicity and awesome power of "home-made" bombs.
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Tolerance of environmental damage during war is deep-rooted. 41 Many ethical traditions
value nature, Judaeo-Christian, Muslim, Greek, and Taoist among them, but none of these ancient
cultural norms have operated in any significant way to limit environmental destruction in
wartime. 42 Indeed, tolerance for environmental damage may be growing despite advancing
military technologies that promise a lessening of adverse environmental impact. 43
B. The Declining Carrying Capacity ofthe Earth
1
. The Capacity of the Earth to Absorb Environmental Catastrophe is Declining.
As the capabilities of our planet to avoid environmental catastrophe on
the one hand and military catastrophe on the other continue to diminish, one can
only hope that moral, legal, common sense or other restraint will prevent
techniques of environmental warfare of today or tomorrowfrom exacerbating our
growing dilemma. Thus the nations of the world disregard at their peril the fifth
general principle of the World Charterfor Nature that, "Nature shall be secured
against degradation caused by warfare or other hostilities.^
In similar words many writers recount the staggering individual and cumulative
consequences and effects of war and pollution. 43 Environmental damage during armed conflict
41
Almond, supra note 34, at 137. "The neglect of the environment as a distinct concern was consistent with the
overall view of Western civilization that nature existed solely for the glory of humankind. International law. in its
formative period, reflected the anti-nature bias of our civilization." Richard Falk, Environmental Disruption by
Military Means and International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE. A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY
APPRAISAL 36 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).
Christopher D. Stone, The Law as a Force in Shaping Cultural Norms Relating to War and the Environment, in
Cultural Norms. War .and the Environment 64, 67-69 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1988). In the Old Testament
(Dueteronomy 20: 19) may be found the admonition: "When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in fighting
against it to take it. thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of
them, and thou shalt not cut them down, for is the tree of the field a man that it should be besieged by thee?"
Leibler, supra note 6, at 67. The Koran (al Quran 25:63) contains the plaudit: "For the true servants of the Most
Gracious are those who tread gently on the earth." Sharp, supra note 26, at 1.
Henry H. Almond, Jr., Strategiesfor Protecting the Environment: The Process ofCoercion, 23 U. Tol. L. Rev.
308- 309 (1992). "In the Second World War, and in subsequent wars, states showed that they could use force,
seemingly untroubled about the increasing dcstrucUvcness of their attacks and their unwillingness to constrain
themselves against that destructiveness." Id. at 309. "(T)he trends in using force for the full impact of its shock
are so strongly entrenched in state practice that we can reasonably expect that they will use the instruments of war
or destruction as freely in the future as they have in the past." Id.
Westing, supra note 2, at 10.
*5See, e.g., Brunnee, supra note 17, at 1742; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1; Gormley. supra note 23, at 86
(" '(M)an has become the endangered species' ... so pressing is the danger of ecological destruction by
pollution."). See infra part II.C.l.
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and "environmental exhaustion" due to over-consumption and pollution threaten the Earth's
"global carrying capacity," i.e., the adequacy of planetary resources to sustain life. 46 War and
preparations for war consume vast amounts of natural resources. 47 Military operations other than
war, such routine things as weapons exercises and shock testing of new naval vessels, also have
the potential to cause environmental damage.48
We may only speculate how much more abuse the planet can take before irreversible
damage of cataclysmic dimension will occur. 49 On the other hand, many believe that the dire
predictions of environmentalists are exaggerated. 50 Uncertainty, however, suggests caution, not
minimization.51
One virtual certainty is that a conventional world war on the scale of World War II or
worse, a thermonuclear war, is on environmental grounds alone too devastating to permit if by
any reasonably practical means it can be deterred or prevented. 52 Even in a regional conflict,
AS
Arthur H. Westing. Constraints on Military Disruption ofthe Biosphere: An Overview, in CULTURAL Norms.




°See, e.g., Joseph G. Garrett III, The Army and the Environment: Environmental Considerations During Army
Operations 12-15 (Sept. 20, 1995) (paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled
"The Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans
Law and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI); Bruce Harlow.
International Environmental Law Considerations During Military Operations Other Than War 13-16 (Undated)
(paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the
Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't,
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI).
Gormley, supra note 23, at 87; Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment:
An Argumentfor a Third Generation Right, 3 Duke J. Comp. & IntlL. 351, 380 (1993).
E.g., "(T)he tendency of some environmentalists in the weeks before the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War to
forecast utter environmental catastrophe on a global scale may have reduced their credibility and effectiveness."
Adam Roberts, Environmental Issues in International Armed Conflict: The Experience of the 1991 Gulf War 59
(Undated) (paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the
Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't,
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI). Cf Brunnee, supra note 17. at 1743
("(E)nvironmental decline continues and ever more complex, pervasive, and urgent problems arise").
51 McClymonds, supra note 4, at 613 ("(S)ubstances or activities that may be harmful to the environment should be
regulated even if conclusive scientific evidence of their harmfulness is not yet available").
52Thc effects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are indiscriminate almost by definition. Schafer, supra
note 24, at 304. Once released against population centers, their effects cannot be controlled. To some they are the
textbook example of the type of weapons that can cause widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage.
Almond, supra note 34, at 170. Newly arising threats from these weapons include alleged nuclear piracy from the
former Soviet Union and domestic terrorism such as Japan recently experienced during the subway gas attacks.
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destruction of nuclear or chemical weapons facilities could have all of the harmful effects of
Chernobyl or the Sandoz fire with potentially greater and longer lasting consequences. 53 What
may tip the balance of nature toward calamity cannot be regarded lightly.
2. The Destructive Capacity of Modern Weaponry Continues to Increase and to Expand
Into Such New Areas as Environmental Modification.
(M)odern warfare's ability to destroy nature has become increasingly
formidable .... (/)// addition to the destructive capabilities of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons, the capability ofconventional weapons to damage larger
geographical areas has increased dramatically. 54
In this era of maneuver warfare, the battlefield has grown larger as has the conventional
firepower that can brought to bear. 55 Conventional weapons are not the only concern; it is far
too early to discount the threat from nuclear weapons. 36 The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union
in World War II and the air assault tactics of the United States in Vietnam graphically illustrate
Massive pollution, of which bacteriological contamination would be a perfect example, might even rise to the level
of genocide. See Schafcr. supra note 24, at 306-307; and see David Hoffman, Russia's Nuclear Sieve: Moscow
Meeting to Focus on Plugging Safety Gaps, Wash Post, Apr. 17, 1996, at A25 ("Today, Russia is a giant,
unstable nuclear heap, with hundreds of facilities harboring at least 200 tons of plutonium and 800 to 1,200 tons of
highly enriched uranium spread across thousands of miles."). Nuclear weapons testing is also a source of
environmental damage. Gormley, supra note 23, at 93.
5 Consider, for example, the problem of bio-accumulation resulting from the introduction of toxic substances into
the aquatic food-chain as a result of submarine warfare. Consider also the myriad effects of the destruction of toxic
chemical production facilities, such as those that suffered deadly releases during peacetime including the Agent
Orange plant in Seveso. Italy (1976), the methyl-isocyanate plant in Bhopal, India (1984), and the Sandoz
insecticide plant in Basel. Switzerland (1986). See Schafer, supra note 24, at 319-24.
Simonds. supra note 8, at 165.
55M n.2.
-'"Almond, supra note 34, at 178-79. Indeed, the nuclear threat is the genesis of much of the thought on
environmental protection during armed conflict. See Richard A. Falk, The Special Challenge ofOur Time:
Cultural Norms Relating to Nuclearism, in CULTURAL Norms, War and the Environment 53 et seq. (Arthur H.
Westing ed., 1988); and see Almond, supra note 34, at 126. A 1980 resolution of the U.N. General Assembly
noted "the disastrous consequences" of nuclear war and urged states to preserve "nature for present and future
generations." General Assembly Resolution 35/8 (Oct. 30, 1980), quoted in Diederich, supra note 10, at 144 n.39.
Parenthetically, the non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives spawned by the anti-nuclear movement are
themselves means of protecting the environment during armed conflict. The arms control apparatus of the Cold
War offers facilities for the enhancement of environmental security. See Stephen J. Orava, Note, Waging the Next
War: The Carryover ofArms Control Verification Procedures to International Environmental Law, 5 GEO. INTL
Envtl. L. Rev. 151, 163, 169 (1992) and Almond, supra note 43, at 321. It is not "sheer coincidence" that arms
control and disarmament treaties "are directly or indirectly laced with environmental protection objectives."
Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 128.
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the breadth, depth, and lethality of the modern battlefield in very different conditions of terrain
and climate. Storied battlefields of the past - Masada, Agincort, Culloden, Waterloo, Gettysburg,
and even Gallipoli - pale by comparison.
Twentieth century technology has made possible destructive forces of unprecedented
virulence. 57 Thus, "(a)rmed forces are clearly capable of inflicting an impermissible level of
environmental damage that goes beyond what the international legal and moral conscience
otherwise would permit during armed conflict."58 In this new era, the era in which "total war"59
was introduced, it is all the more difficult but all the more important to "judge exactly what
military actions are excessive."60
A curious irony of modern war is that in future armed conflicts combat casualties may be
fewer than those occurring from environmental catastrophes. 61 The largest number of likely
casualties from a wartime environmental catastrophe are, of course, noncombatants, the very
persons humanitarian law has long sought to protect 62 For this reason, too, the environment
must be protected during wartime. 63 Now is the time to determine how best this should be done;
the outbreak of the next major war will be too late.
Environmental modification as a means or method of warfare is an ancient practice, one
for which the United States was severely criticized in Vietnam 64 In the late 1970's and early
1 980's a significant body of opinion concluded that militarily useful environmental modification
• Sharp, supra note 26, at 4. The ratio of "battle intensity." measured in enemy casualties over the period World
War II to Korea to Vietnam is 3:2:1, while the ratio of munitions expended during the same period is 1:5:7. The
ratio of munitions expended per soldier was 1:6: 18. "(H)igher munitions expenditures with no proportional
increase in enemy casualties suggest that these munitions were used against larger and more ill-defined target
areas, resulting in higher levels of environmental damage." Schafer, supra note 24, at 291.
"Sharp, supra note 26, at 65.








Richard Carruthers, International Controls on the Impact on the Environment of Wartime Operations, 10
Enytl. & Plan. L.J. 38, 39-40 (1993); Westing, supra note 2, at 5.
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was near-at-hand 65 Environmental modification directed at outerspace and celestial bodies, the
atmosphere, the lithosphere (landmasses), the hydrosphere (waterbodies), and biota (marine and
terrestrial flora andfauna) was theorized 66
Atmospheric manipulation might include cloud seeding to induce torrential rains and
stratospheric ozone destruction for the purpose of admitting damaging levels of solar radiation
over a large region.67 Lithospheric manipulation might include awakening quiescent volcanoes
and the instigation of earthquakes. 68 Hydrospheric manipulation might include toxic
contamination of waterbodies and the creation of tidal waves.69
However malevolent environmental modification has been in the past, overall it has been
militarily ineffectual, even in Vietnam and the Gulf War. 70 Fear of the consequences of hostile
environmental modification motivated adoption in 1977 of a treaty, the ENMOD Treaty, to
prevent hostile uses of natural forces. 71
C. Protection ofthe Environment
1
.
Protection of the Environmental is an Issue ofHuman Survival.
When the natural environment is damaged and contaminated to the extent
that it threatens life, health, food, shelter and minimum work standards, it also
becomes a threat to established human rights 72
Westing, supra note 2, at 1 ("Only now are we perhaps on the threshold of developing the more sophisticated




Erno Meszaros, Techniquesfor Manipulating the Atmosphere, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL,
Legal and Policy Appraisal 16-22 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).
Westing, supra note 2, at 6.
6
Id. at 7-8. N.B. Many of these lithospheric and hydrospheric effects are believed to be achievable through the
deep detonation of nuclear devices. Hallan C. Altimier, Techniquesfor Manipulating the Geosphere, in
Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal 27 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).
Westing, supra note 2, at 1,5.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
May 18. 1977, 3 1 U.S.T. 33, T.I.A.S. No. 9614. The evolution of the law of war proceeded against a background
of virtual environmental unconsciousness until some awareness was generated by critics of belligerent practices
harmful to the environment during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Falk, supra note 20, at 86.
Downs, supra note 49, at 351.
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Mankind is now recognized as the single greatest environmental threat to human
survival. 73 In the coming century our biggest worry is whether we will destroy our planet and
ourselves with it. 74 Our greatest challenge will be to contain our activity within the carrying
capacity of the Earth. 75 Man's impact on nature has fused human rights and environmental rights
irrevocably. 76
The Right to a Safe Environment77
Man is a species endangered by himself. 78 In order to enjoy the right to life itself,
mankind must have a "decent and safe" environment. 79 The landmark Stockholm Declaration, the
product of the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, 80 first introduced this
juxtaposition of human and environmental rights. "Man has the fundamental right to freedom,
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits life of dignity
and well-being." 81 The right to a safe or "healthy" environment has since been incorporated into
•7-3
Gormley, supra note 23, at 91.
74Holmcs Rolston III, Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet, 18 Yale J. Intl L. 251 (1992).
15
Id.
Audrey Chapman, Symposium Overview. Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental
Protection (Apr. 3-5, 1992), 18 Yale J. Intl L. 215 (1992); and see Dinah Shelton, Human Rights,
Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 Stan. J. Intl L. 103, 109 (1991) ("(I)t is impossible to
separate the interests of mankind from protection of the environment."). The high hurdle for the law pertaining to
environmental protection during armed conflict, as it is for human rights law, is the barrier of state sovereignty.
Almond, supra note 43, at 315.
(A)ll individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being ..." U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 45/14 (Dec. 14, 1990), reprinted in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 9.
8Gormley, supra note 23, at 86.
Id. at 85, 1 1 1-12. Part of the debate in this area centers on whether the right to a safe environment is a human
right or an environmental right. Perhaps the better view is that it is a hybrid, a right that acknowledges the
inseparability of humankind and the environment. See Downs, supra note 49, at 377; McClymonds, supra note 4,
at 592. And see especially Shelton, supra note 76. at 104-105, 1 10. "In reality, the apparent conflict between
human utility and intrinsic value of the environment does not exist because it is impossible to separate the interests
of mankind from protection of the environment. Id. at 109.
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, UN. Conference on the Human Environment
(Stockholm, 1972), U.N. Doc. A/C.48/14, andCorr. 1 (1972).
81
Excerpt from Stockholm Declaration, Principle 1, reprinted in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 10. Principle 1
derived from an American proposal to the effect: "Every human being has a right to a healthful and safe
environment, including air, water, and earth, and to food and other material necessities, all of which should be
sufficiently free from contamination and other elements which detract from the health or well-being of man." U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 48/PC/WG.1/CRP.4 at 65 (1971), reprinted in Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection ofthe Rights ofIndividuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 60 (1982). Article 25 of the
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a number of international, regional, and national instalments, both as "hard" and "soft" law. 82
Despite the rapid growth of this concept it remains controversial, one better characterized as an
emerging right than a customarily accepted one. 83
The right to a safe environment has an individual and a collective component. 84 It springs
from the concept of communal resources, an ancient doctrine ofRoman and early English law that
largely disappeared in the 19th Century with the full flowering of the Lockean concept of labor
capital. 85 In some measure a response to the "tragedy of the commons,"86 the safe environment
right rejects the assignment of legal rights in the resources of the global commons on the basis of
exploitation. 87 A healthy and safe environment is thus one which can sustain development
without over-consumption of the dwindling supply of natural resources. 88
Universal Declaration of Human rights contains an "adequate" environment right. Universal Declaration, infra
note 91, art. 25.
Michelle L Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims ofEnvironmentalAbuse, 18 Yale J. Intt.L.
355. 373 (1992). Conventions incorporating a right to a safe environment include the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights (O.A.U., 1981), the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (O.A.S., 1988), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (U.N.,
1989). the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (I.L.O., 1989). and the
Economic Commission for Europe Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations (U.N., 1990). See Shelton.
supra note 76. at 103. 125-27. The 1986 "Brundtland Principles," the product of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, also provide: "All human beings have the fundamental right to an environment
adequate for their health and well-being." Brundtland Principles art. 1, reprinted in McClymonds. supra note 4, at
596. The new American Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also
recognizes a right to a safe environment, but it has not yet entered into force. Id. at 599. Section 101(c) of the
venerable National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) also recognizes the right to a safe environment. 42 U.S.C. §
4331(c). See also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1 1-12 (39 countries recognize similar rights in their constitutions).
"Hard" law is that which is binding on states; "soft" law is not, although it may carry great moral or political
weight.
McClymonds, supra note 4, at 600.
4Downs, supra note 49, at 366 (quoting Professor Louis Sohn: "(B)ecause collective rights are always ultimately
destined for individuals, they are ipsofacto . . . individual rights.").
John A. Chiappinelli, Comment, The Right to a Clean and Safe Environment: A Case for a Constitutional
Amendment Recognizing Public Rights in Common Resources, 40 BUFF. L. Rev. 567. 570-79 (1992). The question
is not of property, but of community. Rolston, supra note 74. at 252.
86The "tragedy of the commons" is the result of the over-consumption of common resources by large users at the
expense of others, an unrestrained competition to maximize exploitation without internalization of the costs of
doing so. Chiappinelli, supra note 85, at 579 n.61 (citing Garrett Harden, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162
Science 1243 (1968)).
°
'Chiappinelli. supra note 85, at 579-85.
Id. at 584, 594, 603. As noted above, the exploitation (consumption) of resources for military purposes is
enormous, measured both in terms of construction of war machines and in terms of environmental damage and
destruction. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Principles enshrined in the Stockholm and Rio89 Declarations, the World Charter for
Nature90 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights91 undergird the right to a safe
environment, in effect a right of human survival, which Professor Gormley contends has been
accepted as peremptory norm of international law. 92 States, then, have a duty erga omnes to
protect the entire international community from infringements of the safe environment right such
as transboundary pollution. 93 For example, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration reiterate the doctrine of state responsibility, to wit, states are
responsible to "ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction."94
The right to safe environment does not yet protect the environment during armed conflict,
but as an emerging right, it soon may. The difficulty lies in its ambiguity. What is a safe or
healthy environment, or, as the Stockholm Declaration phrased it, one adequate for a life of
dignity and well-being?
on0/Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development
(Rio dc Janeiro, 1992). U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992).
90United Nations World Charter for Nature, UN. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982).
91 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess. (I), U.N. Doc. A/180, at 71 (1948).
Gormley, supra note 23, at 93. Indeed, Professor Gormley argues that "severe instances of life-threatening
destruction can be included within the orbit ofjus cogens" Id. at 96. An obvious advantage of jus cogens status
is universal jurisdiction which greatly expands thefora available for prosecution of delictions. See Henkin. supra
note 24, at 1081-86. The existence and importance of a right to a safe environment, however, should not depend
on some "graduated normativity" or "supernormativity," but rather it should be recognized that all accepted norms
of international law create binding obligations. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law,
11 Am. J. Int-lL. 413, 421, 428-29 (1983).
Gormley, supra note 23, at 93, 97. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe declares that states should ensure that the activities carried out on their territories do not degrade the
environment in another state. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 11. And see Downs, supra note 49, at 353. The
International Court of Justice did not include environmental rights or responsibilities in its enunciation of erga
omnes duties in the Barcelona Traction Case. See Leslie C. Green, State Responsibility and Civil Reparation for
Environmental Damage 9-10 (Undated) (paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium
entitled "The Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with
Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College. Newport, RI).
9
"*Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration admits that humans ". . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature." Rio Declaration, supra note 89. Professor Gormley contends, citing his own work, that the
Stockholm Declaration represents customary international law. Gormley, supra note 23, at 98.
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The terms "safe," "healthy," and "adequate" are not in themselves precise. 95 Further, we
may expect that their meaning will change over time, a reflection of the dynamic nature of
rights. 96 These are not fatal flaws, however. The well known terms "due process" and "self-
determination," for instance, are equally vague and conceptually abstract. 97 It is from judicial
gloss and common usage that terms of art gain recognizable and accepted meaning. 98
Intergenerational Equity
The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora,
andfauna and especially representative examples of natural ecosystems must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful
planning or management, as appropriate"
The corollary of the right to a safe environment is intergenerational equity. 100 The
intergenerational equity theory posits that humans have a duty to preserve for their descendants a
healthy environment capable of sustaining life. 101 Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration declares:
"The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations [emphasis added]." 102 Many
intergenerationalists likewise support the view that the right of human survival, i.e., the right to a
93
"(T)he term 'environment' is neutral in itself, implying no measure of environmental quality." Shelton, supra




Id. at 135 ("Public consciousness can take abstract terms in law and give them meaning in a concrete social and
historical context, rendering them sufficiently precise to allow judicial decisions").
James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its Scope and
Justification, 18 Yale J. Intl L. 281, 285 (1992).
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 80, Principle 2.
Intergenerational equity is conservation of the environment and natural resources for the benefit of future
generations. McClymonds, supra note 4, at 611-13. It is comprised of three aspects: conservation of diversity in
natural and cultural resources; maintenance of environmental quality; and, equal access to resources by current and
future generations. Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104 Harv.
L. Rev. 1484, 1540-41 (1991).
101 Schwartz, supra note 4, at 5 n.15. And see U.N. General Assembly Resolution 45/94 (Dec. 12, 1994) (". . . all
individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being . . . ."). See also The
Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations (Oct. 31, 1990), cited in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 11. NEPA
also recognizes intergenerational equity'. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
Rio Declaration, supra note 89. It is, of course, impossible to predict how future generations will value
particular resources. Oil, a commodity that figured so prominently in World War II and the Gulf War, may be of
little or no use by the middle of next century. See Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1540-43.
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safe environment, is a nonderogable human right which imposes on states an affirmative duty to
"prevent activities under their jurisdiction or control from producing life-threatening
environmental catastrophe." 103
The safe environment and intergenerational equity theories view the environment as
comprised of ecosystems. 104 Damage to ecosystems from catastrophic incidents, habitat
modification, and long-term media contamination, has created "environmental refugees," persons
displaced from environments no longer able to sustain them. 105 Though the right to a healthy
environment now and in the future is "ill-defined and controversial," 106 its recognition would
serve a beneficial purpose. Recognition of rights alone is not sufficient to ensure their enjoyment;
effective enforcement is indispensable.
2. Protection of the Environment Needs a Legal Status Commensurate with its
Importance.
A right to a safe environment is important because the development of such a right "would
place environmental protection on an equal level with other human rights for balancing purposes,
rather than subordinating it to human rights, such as the right to property." 107 Current
protections for the environment during armed conflict derive from customary law of armed
conflict and property-based protections under humanitarian law. 108 The scheme for protection of
1 01
Schwartz, supra note 4. at 6. The criminalization of aggressive war is also related to intergenerational equity,
being "fundamentally designed to protect the welfare of future generations of mankind." Leibler, supra note 6. at
94-95.
Schwartz, supra note 4. at 6.
105iyjJ
Id. at 4. Refugees are also a significant wartime concern and thus figure prominently in Geneva humanitarian
law protections. Article 55 of Protocol I relates to protection of the civilian population. See infra part V.B.2.
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 9. While it may be difficult to reach consensus on specific standards for protection
of the environment and natural resources, this should not be confused with the need to define and protect a
fundamental right to a safe environment, one that ameliorates the condition of the environment during armed
conflict. See Downs, supra note 49, at 376. Further, intergenerational equity and the right to a safe environment
conflict with two powerful counter-forces: the right to sustainable development and state sovereignty. Id. at 382-
83, and see McClymonds, supra note 4, at 584.
Shelton, supra note 76, at 111.
See infra part V.B. and see also Roach, supra note 13. The environment is not property, thus compensation
paid to a farmer for damage to farm buildings, crops, and livestock as the result of an unlawful scorched earth
campaign by a hostile force neglects other environmental damages such as endangerment of species through loss of
habitat, respiratory disease suffered by neutrals in an adjacent country from inhalation of toxic substances, and
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the environment during armed conflict must go beyond mere incidental protection; it must
incorporate international environmental law. 109 After all, the purpose of environmental law is to
sustain life globally, and not merely in peacetime. 1 10
The issue is not altogether unlike the debate over whether the U.S. Constitution needed a
Bill of Rights. The adoption of the Bill of Rights acknowledged the importance of special
protections for fundamental rights, as it may be said that the several human rights conventions
acknowledge the importance of these fundamental rights under international law. The worldwide
growth of environmental law is evidence that the environment has now attained a level of
importance that warrants special legal protections.
A comprehensive new treaty may not be a necessary vehicle for the law pertaining to
environmental protection during armed conflict, but entrusting basic necessities of life to
incidental legal protections is short-sighted. The possible adverse consequences of unrestrained
population growth and environmental degradation outside armed conflict are themselves sufficient
reasons for recognition of a right to a safe environment and the corresponding duties associated
with intergenerational equity. While there is room for optimism born of the successes achieved
over the last two decades of conservation and environmental protection, the world community
must anticipate that, for the foreseeable future, environmental pressures will increase not abate,
and that armed conflict will only exacerbate them.
Without an underpinning of fundamental rights environmental protection during armed
conflict will continue to be eclipsed by antithetical forces. 1 1
1
International law is least powerful
eutrophication of debris-choked waterbodies which could result from the same occurrence. See Baker, supra note
10, at 373. See also Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2. at 204-205 ("The environment stricto sensu is not treated as
property in the traditional legal sense. However, under the emerging international law of environmental
protection, a state is deemed to have a protectable interest in the environment circumscribing its sovereign
territory").
The approach to environmental protection must be integrative, a reflection of ecological interdependence.
Shelton, supra note 76, at 1 10. "[The] 'dictates of public conscience' [in the Martens Clause] and principles of law
increasingly recognize that the environment should be protected in its own right." Baker, supra note 10, at 351-52.
And see infra part V.A.2.
Shelton, supra note 76, at 1 1 1
.
ill
Customary norms are susceptible to "extreme subjectivity and selectivity". Falk, supra note 20, at 86 ("(T)he
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when it neglects rights in favor of rules; rules of compulsion or prohibition weaken when they lack
normative consensus. Correspondingly, problems of enforcement are exacerbated by this
dichotomy. The law must enunciate what values it seeks to preserve and protect before it can
provide credible remedies.
D. The Significance of Conventional Law
1 . A Multilateral Framework Convention is Ultimately the Best Protection.
Environmental protection, in general, and during armed conflict, in particular, is a matter
not only of sovereign rights and state responsibility, but also of individual rights and
responsibilities. Because of the breadth and depth of environmental protection issues and their
typically scientific and technical nature, 112 environmental protection is not readily served by the
necessarily general rules of customary international law. 113 Furthermore, not only has
international environmental law developed largely through treaties and conventions, 114 the trend
in the closely-related field of human rights is to conventions under the auspices of the U.N. or
regional organizations. 115
Protection of the environment needs to be grounded in cognizable rights, preferably rights
that are treaty-based. 116 Despite the wide acceptance that the Stockholm Declaration has
history of modern warfare shows the subordination, if not abandonment, of these customary' principles in time of
war, with postwar assessments of 'illegality' confined generally to the practices of the losing side").
See Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1529.
11-5 r
(C)ustomary law lacks the specificity required to fully protect the natural environment." Simonds, supra note
8, at 168. Consider also the following: "Environmental protection negotiations under hostile circumstances would
seem unlikely, which is another reason for establishing prospective rules in the law of war." Diederich. supra note
10, at 137 n.3. Of course, combat hinders environmental assessments and response actions, too. Okordudu-
Fubara, supra note 2, at 134, 139.
Indeed, a complicating factor and an argument in favor of a single, comprehensive convention is the plethora
of authorities bearing to varying degrees on environmental protection during armed conflict. Gupta, supra note 9,
at 271. See also James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International
Environmental Law. 14 Va Envtl. L.J. 423, 424 (1995).
1 15See generally Thomas Buergenthal, INTERNATIONAL Human RIGHTS 21 et seq. (2d ed. 1995). Treaty law is
strongest when linked to prior customary law.
1 16McClymonds, supra note 4, at 592. "(A)mbiguous language and other limitations demonstrate the need for a




garnered over the years, the right to a safe environment is said not to have entered into customary
international law. 117 Neither, it is said, is it yet a general principle of international law. 118
Indeed, the "equivocation" of the 1992 Rio Declaration on the subject of a right to a safe
environment - in favor of the right to sustainable development - undercuts rather than enhances
the safe environment concept. 119
One advantage of conventional law over customary law is that the obligations of a treaty
and the date that a state becomes bound by them, can be fairly accurately determined. 120
Whether a state is bound by customary rules, and if so from what moment, is more difficult to
ascertain. 121 Another advantage to conventional law is that it prevents a "dangerous . . . defacto
oligarchy" of "the most powerful states" from imposing its will on the majority of states. 122
A secondary benefit of a comprehensive treaty that would apply during armed conflict is
that it would alleviate ambiguity concerning suspension of laws and treaties applicable in
peacetime. Many domestic environmental statutes, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, for example, may be waived in wartime. 123 Treaty applicability
in wartime depends on the "intrinsic character" of the provisions in question. 124
Environmental protection is not necessarily incompatible with armed conflict. "Two
nations can be at war, and still follow norms that protect the environment." 125 "As between
belligerents and third parties, the rule is established: the law of peace is not suspended in time of
war. But between belligerents, the application of peacetime treaties is unclear." 126 A
1 1
7




/c/. at 598. Has Stockholm's "optimism" given way to Rio's "cynicism"? See Bnmnee, supra note 17, at 1744.
120
Weil, supra note 92, at 433.
121M
ljL
~Id. at 441. The law "they" want is the law the others get.
123CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The exemption applies during actual combat only. United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 841 F.Supp. 962 (CD. Cal. 1992).
124Sharp, supra note 26, at 23.
125M at 24.
Simonds, supra note 8, at 188. Even though international environmental law is a specialized regime similar in
that regard to the law of armed conflict, it remains unclear to what extent, if any, it would be suspended during
hostilities. Id. at 189. Suspending environmental law during armed conflict without violating the rights of neutral
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comprehensive treaty, ifwidely ratified, could make the applicability of environmental protections
more definite and certain.
Ratified international agreements are also the best method for protecting human rights,
many of which are intimately related to the law of armed conflict and to environmental law. 127
United Nations treaties have been crucial to both the legitimacy and enforceability of international
human rights. 128 The practical benefits of broad recognition and widespread acceptance gained
under the United Nations has been of immeasurable benefit to the development of a large body of
humanitarian law since World War II. 129 Because of the close connection of human rights and
environmental rights, a similar approach might be used for environmental protection during armed
conflict.
A multilateral convention would place environmental protection where it belongs, on the
same plain as fundamental human rights. 130 Such a convention could strike a balance between
competing human rights and environmental rights for the benefit of current and future
generations. 131 Specific prohibitions in treaty form are also important because "ad hoc
considerations of military necessity have been allowed to prevail in the absence of specified
prohibitions on weapons or targets." 132 This "primacy of military necessity" which grew out of a
long-standing "disregard of environmentally disruptive effects" needs self-conscious restraints,
restraints that existing customary international law does not now provide. 133
states would be problematic. Id. at 190.








'Shelton, supra note 76, at 1 1 1-12.
132Falk, supra note 20, at 83.
133JJSee Falk, supra note 41, at 37. "The law of war, being closely related to the dominant preoccupation of leaders
of states with sovereign prerogatives in matters of security and survival, has been plagued to a greater extent than
any other area of international law with a reluctance to confine governmental discretion within bounds." Falk,
supra note 20, at 80.
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2. The Convention-Protocol Process Provides a Practical Solution for Resolving Difficult
Issues.
International environmental law has attempted to deal with some of its thorniest issues,
ozone depletion and protection of global commons such as Antarctica, for example, through the
convention-protocol process. 134 This approach begins with broad conceptual agreement and
works toward greater specificity over time as states' interests coalesce into consensus on
workable solutions. 135 While even the Vienna-Montreal ozone accords took some eight years to
come into effect, this relatively lengthy process is still faster than the time that one would expect it
to take for a norm of customary international law to develop and enter into effect. 136
The two elements, the framework convention and the implementing protocol, go hand-in-
hand. The one will not work without the other. The generality required to gain assent to the
framework convention disserves the interests of enforcement. 137 Conversely, it is not always
possible to reach immediate agreement on complex technical aspects of implementation; neither
science nor technology may then be capable of resolving the issues in dispute or of providing the
kind of solid understanding of relevant environmental consequences that will bring states to
identify their national interests with implementation.
1 34The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, for one; the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty, for another. Protection of the global commons may be the beginning of a trend toward global
community and global order and security predicated on interdependence (vice sovereign independence). Almond,
supra note 43, at 3 14-15. "Preservation of the environment is a shared responsibility of all our nations. Id. at 3 17
(quoting the Charter of Paris). The focus is an international one divorced from territorially-based considerations,
one that looks at the "actual environmental impact of state activity" and its derivative impact on "the vital
ecological interests of the community of states." Brunnee, supra note 17, at 1745. See also Gupta, supra note 9, at
273. The Antarctic Treaty is a good example of a preventative approach that should be used with environmental
protection during armed conflict. Simonds, supra note 8, at 214. And see infra part 1V.B.2.
* 35
SV<? Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1555-69.
lJO
Id. at 1544. If one considers that the law of environmental protection in armed conflict is a creature of the Gulf
War, then it is only five years old. When one considers the possibility that this body of law is not as well developed
as some argue, then one must acknowledge that it cannot be predicted with any certainty how long it will take for





E. A Fifth Geneva Convention
In the wake of the Gulf War, dissatisfaction with the state of environmental protection
during armed conflict led to a clamor for new protections. Addressing the criticism that the law
of armed conflict provides only incidental protection to the environment, the United Nations, the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), Greenpeace International ("Greenpeace"),
and others examined the need for a new, comprehensive convention focused specifically on the
perceived deficiencies of existing law. 138 At a conference in London in June 1991 sponsored by
Greenpeace and hosted by the London School of Economics, 139 a proposed new convention,
styled as a "Fifth Geneva Convention," was debated. 140 The proposal drafted by Professor Glen
Plant has not generated significant support. 141
JOCarruthers, supra note 64, at 50: Baker, supra note 10, at 373. The ICRC took up consideration of the matter
at its Twenty-sixth International Conference in late 1991. Hans-Peter Gasser, For Better Protection ofthe Natural
Environment in Armed Conflict: A Proposalfor Action, 89 Am. J. INTL L. 637, 640 (1995). The ICRC submitted
its recommendations to the U.N. in 1992. leading to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 47/37 of November 1992.
Id. Resolution 47/37 calls upon member states to ratify Protocol I and the ENMOD Treaty. Id. The ICRC
conducted a second meeting of "experts" in April 1993 this time leading to U.N. General Assembly Resolution
48/30. Id. Resolution 48/30 invites member states to incorporate into their military manuals the environmental
protection "guidelines" recommended by the ICRC. Id. at 640-41. The resolution does not approve the guidelines
but makes the item part of the UN's agenda for its Decade of International Law. Id. at 640. The ICRC's
"Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict" are contained in the appendix to Dr. Gasser's article. Id. at 641-43. And see infra part III.B.l.
: London Round Table Conference on A Fifth Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time
of Armed Conflict, June 3, 1991, organized by the London School of Economics, Greenpeace International, and
the Centre for Defence Studies. A second conference entitled "Conference of Experts on the Use of the
Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare was convened by the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs in
July 1991. Gasser, supra note 138, at 639. A third conference of "experts," this time convened by the
International Council on Environmental Law, occurred in Munich, Germany in December 1991. Id.
1 40lwThe proposal, entitled "Elements of a New Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed
Conflict (Second Revision)," endeavors to make "clear statements on the relevant rules of customary law
concerning, inter alia, state and personal criminal responsibility." Glen Plant, Government Proposals and Future
Prospects, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION .AND THE Law OF War 183 (Glen Plant ed., 1992). "Environment" is
not defined. Id. at 188. The proposal follows the basic approach of revisions to Geneva law and Hague law vice
wholesale redrafting. Id. at 186.
Gasser, supra note 138, at 639. The proposal would apply to all armed conflict, international and non-
international, and subordinate military necessity' to protection of the environment. Plant, supra note 140, at 183-
207. Borrowing the ENMOD Treaty standard of "widespread, long-lasting or severe," the proposed convention
would create an "Organization" with remedial powers. Id. Among other prohibitions the proposed convention
would outlaw defoliation for purposes of construction of military infrastructure and would also outlaw any attacks
on forests even when used by an enemy force for cover or concealment. Id.
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The Greenpeace initiative is criticized for its failure to accommodate legitimate self-
defense interests. 142 Self-defense is a matter of national survival and thus a matter of state
prerogative that even the most progressive and law-abiding governments will continue to guard
jealously. 143 A second criticism is that the Greenpeace initiative would undermine the existing
Geneva conventions by attaching to that body of law a contentious appendage that does not enjoy
the near universal acceptance and support given by the international community to the four major
humanitarian conventions. 144
As one participant at the London Conference phrased it:
Lawyers and those concerned with the law often respond to what is seen as
a new problem by wanting to invent or create new laws. This is not, however,
always the best possible course to take. 145
While in fact little "new" law may be needed, 146 one lesson to be learned from the London
Conference 147 is that the coherence, acceptance, compulsion, and effectiveness of existing law
might be better served through an effort, largely of codification, to achieve a comprehensive
convention. 148
in
Sharp, supra note 26, at 57. Marine Major Sharp curtly dismissed the Greenpeace initiative, remarking "To
believe that another piece of paper that restates the existing law would prevent any further intentional
environmental damage - such as the damage suffered in Kuwait - is naive, if not absurd." Id. at 58. No murder
statute prevents homicides any more than a human rights treaty prevents "disappearances" and other abuses. It is
not the legal document itself that is significant, but rather the ordered process that it creates that can have
ameliorative effect.
Falk, supra note 20, at 81; see also Wilcox, supra note 25, at 301.
144
Plant, supra note 140, at 205.
Adam Roberts, An International Relations Expert's Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION and THE Law
of War 151 (Glen Plant ed., 1992). And see American Society of International Law, supra note 24, at 224
(remarks of Captain Geoffrey Greiveldinger) ("(T)he adoption of any single document is not going to be the
definitive exposition of what international law is.").
146
"(0)ne of the conclusions of the London Round Table conference, sponsored by Greenpeace, was that 'the rules
of [humanitarian law] currently in force could substantially limit environmental damage, providing they are
correctly complied with and fully respected." Sharp, supra note 26, at 58-59. Cf "That international legal
provisions bearing on the protection of the environment during time of war could and should be substantially
improved, is clearly documented . .
.
." Gunter Handl, A Fifth Geneva Convention on the Protection ofthe
Environment in Time ofArmed Conflict, 42 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 976 (1993) (reviewing Glen Plant,
Environmental Protection and the Law of War (1992)). See also Leibler, supra note 6, at 133-34.
Handl. supra note 146, at 977 ("(E)vents since the London Conference have amply confirmed the precarious
nature of assumptions about the emergence of a new and more effective world order in which states might be able
and willing to tackle legislatively the protection of the environment in times of war.").
14
°One suggestion is that a new convention should supplement, not replace. Protocol I and the ENMOD Treaty.
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Continuing, this participant observed:
On the question of a new convention for the environment, one central point
must be clear: environmental issues are classic issues of the types that need to be
addressed by the law of war. The law of war has traditionally, since at least 1879,
addressed weapons and methods of warfare which have long-lasting effects, even
after the war itself is over. Hence, for example, the prohibition on such mines at
sea as cannot be prevented from destroying ships long after the immediate conflict
is over. The law of war has always addressed methods of warfare which have
widespread effects, for example, effects on neutral countries [emphasis added]. 149
Still, no matter how logical or compelling the new treaty approach may be, the task of obtaining
agreement even to mere codification of international law can be long, tortuous, and ultimately
unsuccessful. 150
Part III
Are We Likely To Achieve Such A Convention In The Foreseeable Future?
In this part we will look at the predominating view in international law that existing law
adequately protects the environment during armed conflict. We will see that the United Nations,
the United States, and the ICRC, as well as many academics, agree that no new convention is
needed. We will observe how environmental protection may be achieved through incorporation
of environmental protection guidelines into military manuals and training. Concluding that
ambiguity and omissions make existing law make an unsound permanent foundation for
environmental protection during armed conflict, we will explore whether the guidelines approach
serves the needs of enforcement.
Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 219. Further, it should be self-executing. Gupta, supra note 9, at 272. A
"modest" agreement that would "garner wide support" would be better than a more comprehensive treat) that
might have no "practical value" because of a lack of adherence. Simonds, supra note 8, at 220.
^Roberts, supra note 145, at 153.
'States may share common interests in environmental protection but may still be unable to hammer-out a
comprehensive protective scheme. See Almond, supra note 34, at 178.
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A. The Prevailing View - Existing Law Adequately Protects the Environment During Armed
Conflict
1 . No "Major Players" Support A New Convention.
Whatever the merits of a Fifth Geneva Convention might be, the weight of opinion in the
international community favors strengthening existing protections under the law of armed
conflict. 151 Neither the United Nations, nor the ICRC, nor the United States 152 or any other
leading power support a new convention. Even the ICRC called the proposal for a Fifth Geneva
Convention "radical." 153
Building on the work of three post-Gulf War conferences of experts, 154 the ICRC
conducted three meetings of experts of its own 155 which resulted in the formulation of
"Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times
of Armed Conflict." 156 Calling its guidelines a "resume" but not a "codification," the ICRC
recommended them for "widest dissemination" and "scrupulous respect." 157 In 1994, the U.N.
General Assembly, without formally approving the guidelines, recommended that all states give
due consideration to incorporating the guidelines into their military manuals. 158
l "
'"Any attempt to proscribe environmental damage in terms of a fixed level of damage that cannot be exceeded
would be impractical and would fail." Sharp, supra note 26, at 32. "The military commander must be given the
discretion to weigh the military necessity of an act with its corresponding environmental damage." Id.
1 2The position of the United States on altering the existing legal regime is "reluctance." Simonds. supra note 8,
at 166.
1 53
Gasser, supra note 138, at 639. In remarks delivered to the American Society of International Law in
September 1995, ICRC senior legal advisor Hans-Peter Gasser cited excessive cost and risk of failure as the
primary reasons why pursuing a new convention was not advisable. Dr. Gasser opined that failure to achieve a
new convention might actually have a negative impact on the law, that is, that a new Geneva-style convention may,
because of the controversy surrounding it. undermine the other Geneva Conventions and thereby erode rather than
expand universal support for and adherence to humanitarian law relative to armed conflict. Hans-Peter Gasser.
Remarks at the Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Sept. 26. 1995). One might also
hvpothesize that the ICRC opposes a new convention because it does not want to be burdened with the
responsibilities of a monitoring agency (including costs) in derogation of its existing humanitarian functions. At
least one commentator recommended that the proposed "Green Cross" function be assumed by the Red Cross.
Diederich. supra note 10, at 159-60.
_
Baker, supra note 10, at 352 n.5; and see supra note 138.
1
_
See Morris, supra note 5, at 779-80.
Gasser, supra note 138, at 640. The full text of the guidelines is set out in id. at 641-44.
l57w.at641.
1 58
Id.; Roach, supra note 13, at 3. This is an educational approach. Diederich. supra note 10, at 157.
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Two by-products of this four-year long discourse, loosely under U.N. purview, are the
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 159 and the joint
U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard manual, The Commander's Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations.^® The guidelines approach is clearly the way the law of armed
conflict is developing. 161 The call for a new convention has fallen silent. 162
2. The Academics Agree.
In September 1995, a symposium entitled "The Protection of the Environment During
Armed Conflict and other Military Operations" was conducted by the United States Under
Secretary of Defense at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. 163 The
symposium, which brought together military and academic experts from the U.S. and abroad,
reached the same consensus as the ICRC, that is, "that the existing legal regime adequately
protects the environment during international armed conflict," and also that the existing law
adequately addresses military operations other than war. 164
Echoing the ICRC, which participated in the symposium, the consensus of the symposium
was that a new convention was "neither necessary nor desirable, at least in the near term," that an
ambiguous convention may do more harm than good, and that there were no good prospects for
achieving "widespread acceptance of a new agreement." 165 The symposium likewise took the
159The San Remo Manual "articulates the considered views of a group of international lawyers and naval experts
on the law of war providing protection to the environment in time of armed conflict at sea". Roach, supra note 13,
at 6 The Manual provides that "(m)ethods and means of warfare should be employed with due regard for the
natural environment taking into account the relevant rules of international law. Damage to or destruction of the
natural environment notjustified by military necessity and carried out wantonly is prohibited [emphasis added]."
Id. at 6-7.
160Roach, supra note 13, at 7.
*® l
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 382-83 ("In seeking to protect the environment in its own right, the
temptation is strong to identify new or specialized protections, but the wiser course is to pursue broader acceptance
and more vigorous enforcement of existing rules.").
162The "legislative moment" has passed. See Falk, supra note 20, at 81.





view that "more effective and efficient enforcement of the existing laws is needed." 166 The
balance of opinion favored education and training over punishment as the better means of seeking
compliance. 167
Of course, not everyone agrees. A number of legal scholars still believe that the existing
law is inadequate to protect the environment during armed conflict. 168
B. The Indoctrination Alternative
1. The Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict.
The ICRC guidelines approach - peacetime indoctrination of armed forces - is eminently
sensible. It instills an environmental ethic during peacetime that should carry-over into armed
conflict. The approach, however, is not without its shortcomings. Manuals are not treaties; they
are unilateral, not reciprocal. How states will choose, incorporate, and apply the guidelines are
matters mostly of state discretion. 169 An even greater issue is what is a manual, that is, at what
level of authority should the guidelines be incorporated?
An armed force communicates authoritative information by several means including orders
and directives. Service-wide manuals, of which each of the U.S. Armed Forces has many, are
another. Service manuals may contain law, policy, or some combination of the two. 170 In armed
conflict, rules of engagement, which govern how and when force may be used, and operational





Id. at 8; Simonds, supra note 8, at 166. Wil D. Verwey, Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict: Do We Need Additional Rules? 13 (Undated) (paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College
Symposium entitled "The Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations")
(on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport,
RI) ("It seems that one cannot but come to the conclusion that protection of the environment in times of armed
conflict is insufficiently assured by existing rules of international law.").
Roach, supra note 13, at 3.
*'®See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5090. IB (Environmental and Natural
Resources Program Manual Nov. 1, 1994) [hereinafter cited as Navy Environmental Manual].
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other commonly used methods of transmitting guidance and direction. In short, there are a
variety of vehicles that may be used to convey restraints on environmental damage during armed
conflict. Which one is best?
The best place for environmental protections, if they are to have more than transitory
effect during armed conflict, is in doctrine. Rules of engagement and operational orders certainly
may be used to impose targeting limitations and other case-specific restraints, but these do not
speak, as doctrine does, to the way the armed forces will fight. "Cookbook" environmental
manuals which are usually focused on domestic compliance matters are also inappropriate.
Doctrine belongs in doctrine publications whatever they may be called; it is a distinct body of
military theory.
Doctrine, "(s)imply put, . . . affects how one fights, trains, exercises, and plans, and it
organizes what one buys." 171 Doctrine, or more specifically military doctrine, is policy which is
also intended to standardize behavior. 172 The primary attribute of military doctrine is that it
comprises the fundamental principles, not specific procedures, that guide the employment of
forces. 173 In the chaos of combat, doctrine affords a common framework; it is a "mode of
harmonious thinking." 174
Doctrine is not law, but environmental protection during armed conflict nonetheless
belongs in doctrine. Environmental protection needs to be injected into the core of military
thinking, not grafted onto an outer layer of quasi-legal, policy guidance. Environmental
protection - affirmative obligations and express prohibitions - must permeate the planning and
execution of military operations. So it matters, then, not just that environmental protection






'*Id. When doctrine incorporates environmental considerations, uncertainty over tactical options will be
lessened. See William Wright IV, Naval Warfare and the Environment 5 (undated) (paper presented to the
September 1 995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the Environment During Armed
Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI). Accord Garrett, supra note 48. at 13-14.
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guidelines are incorporated into military manuals, it matters which military manuals are used and
how they are used. 175
A coincidental benefit of military manuals is that they not only reflect opinio juris, they
help to conform state practice, an important aspect of the law-making process. 176 Due to the
notorious laxity of enforcement in international law, national implementation is critical to
successful lawmaking. 177
2. Military Doctrine of the United States.
U.S. war fighting doctrine does not provide expressly for environmental protection during
armed conflict, but environmental considerations are beginning to take root in other sources of
law and policy for military commanders. The most recent edition of The Commander's
Handbook on the Law o/Na\>al Operations applies environmental considerations to targeting:
8. 1.3 Environmental considerations. It is not unlawful to cause collateral damage
to the natural environment during an attack upon a legitimate military objective.
However, the commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary
damage to the environment to the extent that it is practicable to do so consistent
with mission accomplishment. To that end, as far as military requirements permit,
methods or means of warfare should be employed with due regard to the
protection and preservation of the natural environment. Destruction of the natural
environment not necessitated by mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly
is prohibited. Therefore, a commander should consider the environmental damage
which will result from an attack on a legitimate objective as one of the factors
during targeting analysis. 178
Conversely, "the absence of a manual or the use of manuals whose content does not include the relevant norms
would strongly suggest that these norms have not been adopted." W. Michael Reisman & William K. Leitzau,
Moving International Law From Theory to Practice: The Role ofMilitary Manuals in Effectuating the Law of
Armed Conflict, in The Law of Naval Operations 8 (U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Horace
B. Robertson, Jr. ed.. 1991).
1 H£\
Frits Kalshoven, A Comment to Chapter 11 ofthe Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNax'al Operations, in
The Law of Naval Operations 300 (U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Horace B. Robertson, Jr.
ed.. 1991); Reisman & Leitzau, supra note 175, at 7-8 (norms formed by "homologous national action").
'Reisman & Leitzau, supra note 175, at 8.
1 78US. Dept of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations 1,8.1.3 (Naval Warfare Publication No. 1-14M/Marine Corps Warfare Publication No.
MCWP 5-2. 1/Commandant Publication No. P5800.7: 8-2 1995). The prior iteration of this work, known as NWP-
9, contained no similar provisions. See Kalshoven. supra note 176, at 309. Moreover, the annotated supplement
to NVVP-9 stated that the U.S. was not bound by Protocol I's prohibition on environmental reprisals. U.S. Dept of
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This is believed to be the first policy statement in a military manual specifically requiring
protection of the environment during armed conflict. 179 Doctrinal publications, such as the U.S.
Navy's publication Naval Warfare, the work of the Naval Doctrine Command, do not address
environmental protection in any but the most tangential way. 180 Further environmental protection
guidance from the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is anticipated. 181 Perhaps in
formulating this guidance the Joint Chiefs might seek input from the several services' doctrine
commands.
C. An Impermanent Solution
1
. Ambiguities and Omissions in Existing Law Afford No Sturdy, Permanent Foundation
for Environmental Protection.
There is substantial authority to the effect that intentional destruction of the environment
which is not militarily necessary is unlawful. 182 But what does this really tell us? How might this
the Navy, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations % 6-24
(Naval Warfare Publication No. 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10 1989) And see Simonds, supra note 8, at 209. A targeting
vice weapons approach affords more flexibility in drawing distinctions between justified and unjustified
environmental damage. Simonds, supra note 8, at 215.
Roach, supra note 13, at 7. The Army's field manual on operations and the Air Force's pamphlet on armed
conflict do not contain similar provisions. See, e.g., U.S. Deft of the Army, Operations (Army Field Manual
No. 100-5 1993); U.S. Dept of the Air Force, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and
Air Operations (Air Force Pamphlet No. 1 10-3 1 1976). The 1976 Air Force pamphlet, which predates Protocol I
and the ENMOD Treaty, mentions the Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 53, but does not discuss its applicability to
environmental protection, a role that many commentators assign to this important but environmentally-ambiguous
provision. Id. at 14-4. The 1980 iteration describes Protocol I as a new provision not binding on the U.S. U.S.
Deft of the Air Force, Commanders Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict u 6-2 (Air Force Pamphlet
No. 1 10-34 1980). It would be appropriate to also keep in mind that targeting is only one aspect of the use of
armed force; the universe of potential damage to the environment during armed conflict is much larger. It should
be recalled that "(t)he legal regime did not, until very recently, even contemplate deliberate or vindictive
environmental pollution . . . ." Leibler, supra note 6, at 69-70. Professor Kalshoven's 1991 articleA Comment to
Chapter 11 ofthe Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations for the U.S. Naval War College
International Law Studies series mentions the Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 53, and Protocol I, art. 55, but does
not discuss their applicability to environmental protection during armed conflict. Kalshoven, supra note 176, at
306. The Mallison article in the same volume is likewise silent on Protocol I. Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas
Mallison. Na\>al Targeting: Lawful Objects ofAttack, in The Law of Naval Operations 259-60 (U.S. Naval War
College International Law Studies, Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991).
1 ROlou
U.S. Deft of the Navy, Naval Warfare (Naval Doctrine Publication No. 1 1994). See also Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Wareare of the U.S. Armed Forces (Joint Publication No. 1 1991).
1 R1
Roach, supra note 13, at 7.
lo
^See General Assembly Resolution 47/37 (Nov. 25, 1992) ("(D)estruction of the environment, not justified by
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prohibition influence a military commander fighting a desperate rear-guard action against an
overwhelming force? Is the applicability of this prohibition always a question of degree? 183
What should one conclude from the fact that the Protocol I threshold for unlawful environmental
damage does not bind all major military powers including the United States?
Many humanitarian protections under customary and conventional international law for
persons, property, and objects are well-established and enjoy universal acceptance. 184 Can the
same truly be said for the environmental gloss that was placed on these provisions over the last
five years? Was any of this environmental gloss intended to apply to weapons other than of mass
destruction?
The ICRC, the Naval War College symposium experts, and many others are not wrong in
asserting that in many hypothetical cases existing law affords protection to the environment
during armed conflict. It does, but is that protection adequate in a comprehensive way? When
one steps back to gain perspective, does the patchwork of customary and conventional
international law in fact form a coherent mosaic? It does not.
The critical issue is bindingness. There are over a dozen sources of law, but sorting out
who is bound by what is a daunting task. Even the Security Council condemned the
environmental damage caused by Iraq in the Gulf War as unlawful aggression - environmental
terrorism - not as a breach of existing law pertaining to environmental protection during armed
conflict. 185 Incoherence is the operative term. However well it may work in particular instances,
military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing law."). And see, e.g., Sharp, supra note
26, at 55; Simonds, supra note 8, at 200-201; Wilcox, supra note 25, at 310; Caggiano, supra note 2, at 504; and
Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 205. And see generally Roach, supra note 13. "(T)he central notion that a
mode of warfare must be relevant to a military purpose implies the 'illegality' of all modes of behavior that involve
punitive or vindictive destruction, including, by implication, deliberate damage to resources, infrastructure and the
environment." Falk, supra note 20, at 83. Cf. Simonds, supra note 8, at 166 ("(T)he existing law is inadequate").
1 °3For example, would destroying endangered species habitat by the construction of tank traps in a strategic
mountain pass be permissible while breaching a dam and indiscriminately inundating thousands of acres would
not? Does it matter that in the former instance no noncombatants are killed but in the latter thousands are?
I Q A
Roach, supra note 13, at 1-5 (protections afforded to noncombatants, hospitals, and places of worship inter
alia).
1 850 Simonds, supra note 8, at 193. A drawback to this approach - placing liability only on the unlawful aggressor -
is that only the "losers" will be made accountable, at the expense of the environment as a whole. Id. at 179. After
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existing law does not yet provide a comprehensive, permanent solution to the problem of
environmental damage during armed conflict.
2 Unilateral "Guidelines" Are Not an Adequate Basis for Enforcement of International
Law.
Is the ICRC guidelines approach effective if guidelines can be implemented on a pick-and-
choose basis? Must a state adopt a guideline predicated on a point of customary international law
to which it is a persistent objector? Will a state ignore those guidelines originating in conventions
to which it is not a party, e.g., the U.S. vis-a-vis Protocol I? 186
The ICRC guidelines approach may play a beneficial role in shaping state practice which in
turn may contribute to the development of customary law, but the emphasis of the guidelines
approach is prescriptive - conforming one's own military operations to existing law - not
prohibitive - deterring, preventing, or punishing violations of existing law by others that occur
during armed conflict. 187 The ICRC "Guidelines" as a whole are "soft law," to be sure.
Individual provisions may be "hard" or "soft" law depending on the bindingness of their original
sources.
The ICRC "Guidelines" are no substitute for the conventional and customary law sources
from which they are drawn. 188 Thus, enforcement cannot proceed on the basis of the ICRC
"Guidelines" themselves, which in their current iteration will become obsolete as international law
the war, the U.N. General Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee, considering a Jordanian proposal to revise the
ENMOD Treaty, reached "broad agreement that Iraq's deliberate and massive destruction of the environment . . .
violated existing international law." Morris, supra note 5, at 777. The U.S. position before the Committee was
that the damage violated the principle of military necessity enshrined in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Id. at 777 n.9. And see infra part V.A.2 and B. 1.
100See Simonds. supra note 8, at 208 ("(A)ny proposal seeking to curb wartime environmental destruction must
address both . . . substantive insufficiencies and the lack of adherence by states to existing duties").
1
°'ld. ("(B)ecause of the 'military necessity' exception, the rules that do exist [in military manuals] do not result in
absolute protection for the environment.").
l88
I do not mean to suggest that the ICRC asserted that its "Guidelines" may be used as some kind of a substitute
criminal code or authoritative restatement. See supra note 157. I only point out that the Guidelines themselves do




changes over time. Rather, we must turn to original sources to determine whether a violation of
international law will occur or has occurred, and if so, how to deter, prevent, or punish it.
Part IV
How Can The Law Pertaining To Environmental Protection During Armed
Conflict Be Advanced In The Meantime?
In this part we will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of customary international law
vis-a-vis conventional law. We will see how customary international law, properly developed, is
strong. We will note the limitations of opinio juris and the recent tendency to neglect state
practice as an element in the formation of customary law. We will also discuss problems of
enforcement of international law. We will then examine the elements of effective enforcement of
environmental protections during armed conflict. Lastly, we will analyze the particular
importance of prevention to protection of the environment.
A. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Customary International Law
1 . Customary International Law, Properly Developed, Is Strong.
In the absence of a convention with near universal participation like the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the law must develop according to customary practice. Customary law is in
some ways preferable to conventional law, as customary law generally binds all states whether
they have acceded to it or not. 189 Customary law can spring from unilateral action and develop
relatively quickly, 190 as for example did the continental shelf doctrine, beginning with the 1945
Truman Proclamation, 191 continuing with codification in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
1 89
Caggiano, supra, note 2 at 498-99. I say "generally" in order to allow for opting-out by virtue of persistent
objection. Another advantage of customary over conventional law is that it "will be easier to pursue on a practical
level, particularly in times of conflict, than the contractual subtleties of an international agreement." Id. at 499.
iyuOne might argue that nearly 25 years is not "relatively quickly" as compared to the eight years that it took for
the Vienna convention and Montreal protocol on ozone to be achieved. See supra part II.D.
2
191
Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the
Shelf, Presidential Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945)
> Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental
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High Seas, 192 and progressing ultimately to recognition as customary international law in the
1 969 North Sea Continental ShelfCases. 193
One must, however, avoid the temptation to debate the relative strengths and weaknesses
of customary international law versus conventional international law. Both means may be used to
achieve worthwhile ends. 194 One should take special note of the strength of nonderogable norms
of customary international law, norms which have achieved the status of jus cogens.
Nonderogable norms are not subject to opting-out and receive the benefit of universal jurisdiction,
two distinct advantages to be sure. 195
One view holds that "(t)he prohibition against the threat or use of force and fundamental
human rights proscriptions
. . . both belong to the body of international jus cogens"^ 96 Another
view holds that the right to a safe environment is already a peremptory norm. 197 As Prosper Weil
pointed out in his discussion of relative normativity:
There is ... a growing . . . tendency to consider that peremptory norms
create obligations for all states, and that each state has legal standing for those
obligations to be fulfilled and to assert the responsibility of any other state that fails
to observe them. So this enhanced normativity supposedly generates obligations
erga omnes and, thereby, actio popularis
. . . ,
198
And further:
Although a state cannot have invoked against it an ordinary customary rule
that it has rejected from the outset, there seems to be no way whatever for it to
evade the peremptory character of a norm it has not accepted as such. 199
192Convention on the High Seas (1958), 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200.
193The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3.
1 94
**According to one view, customary norms have greater "utility" than treaty-based norms. Falk, supra note 20,
at 82.
See supra note 92.
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources ofHuman Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General
Principles, 1992 Austl. Y.B. IntlL. 82, 103. See also Simonds, supra note 8, at 190-91.
'See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
198Weil, supra note 92, at 430. An important related question is whether the corresponding rights are vested in
individual nations or only in the international community as a whole. Id. at 432. N.B. The concept of an






But perhaps, most importantly:
Whatever their rank, all norms produce legal effects, all are binding, and
the breach of any one, no matter which, constitutes an internationally wrongful act.
What, then, is the point of distinguishing among them?200
Derogable or nonderogable, once norms are recognized and accepted as customary
international law they have legal effect and enjoy equal status with convention-based norms. 201
Thus, "(i)ndirect norms, by way of . . . [customary] international law of war, provide an existing
framework that, if energetically interpreted and implemented, would protect the environment
against military activities."202 As we will see in the next section, however, the requirements for
development of customary norms must be carefully adhered to.
2. The Limitations ofOpinio Juris.
The current trend towards development of customary international law, one might say, is
heavy on opinio juris, light on state practice. That is, the requirement of consistent state practice
may be too often overlooked. 203 Opiniojuris alone does not give rise to customary international
law, it must be followed by consistent state practice before bindingness will attach. 20"*
The danger in the modern trend is that:
The process of customary law-making is thus turned into a self-contained
exercise in rhetoric. The approach now used is deductive, rules or principles
proclaimed, for instance, by the General Assembly, as well as the surrounding
ritual itself, are taken not only as starting points for the possible development of
customary law in the event that State practice eventually happens to lock on to
these proclamations, but as a law-making process which is more or less complete
in itself, even in the face of contrasting "external" facts [emphasis in original]. 205
200
Id. at 429.
20l Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
Falk, supra note 41, at 36.
203Simma & Alston, supra note 196, at 96.
^^"(Onternational law lives in the practice of states . . . ." American Society of International Law, supra note 24,
at 224 (remarks of Captain Geoffrey Greiveldinger).
205Simma & Alston, supra note 196, at 89-90.
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The difficulty is greater as regards peremptory norms. Peremptory norms are mainly
"prohibitive in substance; they are rules of abstention."206 As such, opinio juris plays an
especially important role in the formulation of such norms. 207 However, proving the existence a
negative - a rule of abstention - by resort to state practice, or rather that the lack of state practice
is due to abstinence, is problematic.
One may conclude that "(t)he customary law-making process may be unable to provide
logical and sound devices to identify peremptory norms of abstention. Such norms do not (and
simply cannot) result from a gradual accretion of State practice eventually accepted as law.
Rather, what we witness here is the express articulation of principles in the first instance, ab initio
or progressively being 'accepted and recognized' as binding .... This process does not - or not
yet - lead to the emergence of customary law but to the formation [only] of 'general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations' in the sense of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute."208 On the other
hand, "law-making through international acceptance of general principles appears to be much
better suited than customary law to meeting the requirements for the formation ofjus cogens"209
The development of international environmental law, what little of it has developed out of
customary norms or general principles,210 has been more like the former (gradual accretion) than
the latter (recognition ab initio) Further, Professor Gormley's reasoned analysis to the contrary
notwithstanding, it is premature to assert that any customary norms of international environmental
law have achieved the status ofjus cogens. What then?
In his opening statement to the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, American prosecutor
Robert Jackson asserted:
Unless we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for











.See Schafer, supra note 24, at 299. These norms would include state responsibility for transboundary
pollution, the principle of sic utere, and the right of injured states to seek reparation.
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customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of newer
and strengthened International Law.211
In short, the law, and indeed the law-making process, must be dynamic. The law-making
process, as much as the law itself, must develop progressively in response to changes in the
international community, its organizations, and values. International criminal law is a good case
in point.
International criminal law, like human rights law, lags behind changing human values.212
Changes in values lead to changes in legal principles which eventually lead to changes in state
practice. "Indeed, international criminal law has experienced more evolution in the writings of
scholars than in the practice of states. The tension between what is and what ought to be has
characterized the growth of all legal systems. The proper balance between them, however,
depends on the values and goals sought to be achieved by a given legal system. The earnest
search for this balance invariably leads to the growth of law."213
American international lawyers and judges are criticized for too readily pronouncing
norms of customary international law without a critical examination of the sources of those rights
and without a searching inquiry as to whether such rights have in fact been received into
customary international law.214 This is a sort of "progressive, streamlined theory of customary
law, more or less stripped of the practice requirement."215 We must therefore be cautious lest we
chauvinize international law, a predilection toward "assuming that American values are




*2 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 147 (Secretariat of
the International Military Tribunal ed., 1947) (Opening statement of Justice Robert H. Jackson).
M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Needfor a Specialized Convention, 31 Colum. J.
TransnatlL. 457, 486 (1994).
2U
Id. at 486-88.
214Simma & Alston, supra note 196, at 86-87, 95 ("(Virtually every right which recent U.S. governments have







The irreducible minimum of international law is that opinio juris and state practice are
both required elements of customary norms. In the absence of a Fifth Geneva Convention or
other new treaty, our focus on the law pertaining to environmental protection during armed
conflict must be directed toward the development of customary norms. Moreover, and precisely
because there are a great many sources of legal obligation, our particular focus must be on state
practice.
During armed conflict, the conduct of the armed forces themselves is the most important
evidence of opinio juris and state practice. How armed forces are employed speaks volumes
about which norms are recognized and which are not. Consequently, we should define a role for
armed forces to play in protecting the environment during armed conflict including deterring,
preventing, and punishing unjustified environmental damage. This will not only help to strengthen
international law by solidifying customary norms, it will also aid in the law's effective
enforcement.
3. Weak Enforcement Is the Bane of International Law in General and of Protection of
the Environment During Armed Conflict.
(T)he current legal order clearly proscribes environmental damage that is
not justified by military necessity during armed conflict; equally clear, however,
is that no institutionalized mechanism exists at the international level to
strengthen deterrence by facilitating individual and state accountabilityfor even
the mostflagrant violations of law.
^
No more harsh a criticism can be leveled against a legal system than that it lacks for
enforcement, that it has no means to give itself effect, to impose its order on its regulated
717A Sharp, supra note 26, at 3.
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population. 218 This criticism has been leveled against international law, generally, and against the
environmental protections in the law of armed conflict, particularly. 219
One of the "structural weaknesses" inherent in international law is the "inadequacy" of its
enforcement mechanisms. 220 Individuals have no standing to assert violations of international
environmental law before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals221 and states are loath to impose self-restraints on sovereign prerogatives.222 The time
has come, however, to re-evaluate the "current practice of subordinating effective enforcement [of
international environmental law] to state sovereignty. "223
The aftermath of the Gulf War produced a torrent of legal literature224 calling for Iraq to
be held accountable for dumping oil into the Persian Gulf and for igniting Kuwaiti oil wells,
among other environmentally damaging activities. 225 Still, despite the "astonishing cooperative
M at 4 ("Simply having a normative international legal order prohibiting environmental damage is insufficient
to deter violations of these norms"). "(I)n addition to being substantively inadequate the existing law is
procediually deficient." Simonds, supra note 8, at 202. "The current international procedural and substantive
regime does little to implement ... [a] preventive philosophy." Id.
7 1
9
See, e.g., Caggiano, supra note 2, at 504. The "shortcomings" associated with "self-policing" are "obvious."
Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 213.
770***" Weil, supra note 92, at 414. The structure of international law is changing from a compendium of independent
nations pursuing self-interests to a community drawn together by overarching necessities in search of greater
cooperation. Id. at 422. As the international community evolves from greater diversity to greater unity, it should
become both easier and more beneficial to advance conventional law solutions.
McClymonds, supra note 4, at 633; Schwartz, supra note 82. at 358-59. Recall that ICJ jurisdiction is consent-
based. Okordudu-Fubara. supra note 2, at 214-15.
^^^" [International law] shows a greater facility in preserving the status quo than in doing justice." Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?, Naval War C. Rev., Summer 1992,
at 89, 91 (quoting Richard R. Baxter, former American judge on the International Court of Justice). "Although
international courts may offer some guiding principles for states regarding their conduct in the environmental area,
thev can do little to prevent environmental damage." Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1562.
Orava. supra note 56, at 175.
^^See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Lessonsfor International Law From the Gulf War, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 425 (1993);
Jonathan P. Edwards, The Iraqi Oil "Weapon" in the 1991 Gulf War, 40 Naval L. Rev. 105 (1992); Evan J.
Wallach, The Use ofCrude Oil by an Occupying Power as a Munition de Guerre, 41 INTL& Comp. L.Q. 287
(1992); Laura Edgerton, Eco-Terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold
Iraq Liable?, 22 Ga J. INTL& Comp. L. 151 (1992); Christopher C. Joyner & James T. Kirkhope, The Persian
Gulf War Oil Spill: Reassessing the Lom' ofEnvironmental Protection and the Law' ofArmed Conflict, 24 Case W.
Res J. IntlL. 29 (1992). See also Gupta, supra, note 9; Leibler, supra, note 6; Sharp, supra, note 26; and
Okordudu-Fubara. supra, note 2.
^JThe multifarious impacts of Iraq's actions were widely reported and loudly condemned. See supra notes 6 and
9. Less well understood is the extent to which the "dumping" was actually the result of Coalition air strikes on
Iraqi tankers and oil platforms among other contributing factors. See Arkin, supra note 5, at 7-8. Was the Gulf
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effort of the international community during the recent Gulf Conflict," and despite United Nations
Security Council Resolution 687,226 little has been done to hold Iraq or any Iraqis liable,227
civilly or by of war crimes. 228 Enforcement remains the Achilles Heel of the international legal
system.229
International tribunals, with the limited exception of war crimes tribunals, are effectively
unavailable to hold states or individuals accountable.230 States, especially in matters of armed
War evidence that existing law is adequate or inadequate to protect the environment during armed conflict? Some
say yes. Some say no. As to the former see Roach, supra note 13, at 9. As to the latter see Simonds, supra note 8,
at 206. The Gulf War was undoubtedly good reason to examine the law pertaining to environmental protection
during armed conflict, but international law, no less than military art and science, should not fight the last war,
that is, its focus must be broader than the confines of a particular conflict. For example, what if the oil wells that
were set afire were located in Iraq not in occupied Kuwait? Or. what if the oil wells that were set afire were burned
by Allied forces during an Iraqi counter-attack into Kuwait and a credible case could be made that burning the oil
served the legitimate purpose of denying war materiel to the enemy? These and innumerable other conceivable
situations illustrate the danger of overemphasizing the importance of the Gulf War. The law cannot be said to be
adequate and recommendations for its further development cannot be said to be wise simply because they fit the
peculiar circumstances of any one conflict.
Security Council Resolution 687 of May 2, 1991 imposed the terms of surrender ultimately accepted by Iraq.
The resolution is lauded as the first formal recognition of liability for environmental damage during armed
conflict, although it is criticized for its ambiguity. See Gupta, supra note 9. at 269-71. The claims process,
whereunder states must consolidate and submit claims on behalf of individuals, has yet to bring relief. See
McClymonds, supra note 4, at 632. Cf. Sharp, supra note 26, at 58 ("Actually, the international community has
done a superb job in holding Iraq accountable for the environmental damage that resulted from its actions during
the Persian Gulf War"). And see Simonds, supra note 8, at 178 ("During the recent Gulf War, the U.N. Security
Council used its power to enact legally binding resolutions to hold Iraq liable for environmental damage. This
technique has created legal precedent for future armed conflicts. It may encourage states to take environmental
factors into account before engaging in certain actions during war, and courts may cite it as precedent for holding
states liable for environmental damage during future armed conflicts.").
22
Leibler, supra note 6, at 117; Caggiano, supra note 2, at 504. Cf. Christopher C. Greenwood, State
Responsibility and Civil Liability for Environmental Damage Caused by Military Operations 9-1 1 (Sept. 16, 1995)
(paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the
Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't,
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI).
22
°"War crimes trials should be initiated for several reasons. First, all nations have an obligation to search for
persons accused of grave breaches and to bring them to trial. Second, if the international community fails to
continue the precedent of war crimes trials, then the practice of states - through their contribution to the
development of customary international law - may erode the authority to prosecute offenders. Third. Security
Council resolutions and the pronouncements of world leaders will be of no deterrent value in the future if the
flagrant violations of Iraq go unpunished." Sharp, supra note 26, at 50-51.
22 There are virtually no avenues open for the implementation of existing environmental law of war." Falk,
supra note 20. at 93.
9 "TO
'""Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 214-15. In the "void created by the lack of a permanent and apolitical
judicial mechanism," "politicized decisionmaking" takes over. Sharp, supra note 26. at 55.
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conflict, eschew binding arbitration and the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,231 in favor of the
flexibility of negotiation and ex gratia payments of compensation and other voluntary
remedies.232 They remain reluctant to subordinate their sovereignty to international control
particularly where state survival may be in issue. 233 War crimes trials, little used for
environmental crimes even in World War II, are a rarity.234 The lack of a judicial forum is a
serious deficiency.235
Another handicap is lack of resolve. States will be ambivalent about enforcing
international law when they have trouble defining national interests favoring environmental
protection. Professor Sohn observed:
On the international scene, it is difficult to persuade governments, which as
a group are the international lawmakers, to agree on enforcement against
themselves in the event that they violate international law. It is not the law that is
soft, but the governments. 236
^ J
'The ICJ does not have much experience in environmental protection cases. Harvard Law Review, supra note
100, at 1562. Consider also the impact of reservations in submittals to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
232Almond, supra note 34, at 169, 172-73, 181 n.181. Momentum is gaining in the United Nations for the
creation of a permanent international criminal court modeled on the Nuremberg war crimes tribunals of World
War II. See John M. Goshko, U.N. Moving Toward Creation ofCriminal Court, Wash. Post, Apr. 2 1, 1996, at
A27. The existence of such a court would undoubtedly help with the enforcement of international law regarding
genocide and crimes against humanity even if its docket is controlled to some degree by the Security Council. Id.
Environmental damage during armed conflict, even that which is widespread, long-term, and severe, may not
constitute genocide or a crime against humanity. See infra part V.B.2. And see Sharp, supra note 26, at 62, 65,
66. The temporary criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina are not known to be actively
considering environmental prosecutions. See Buergenthal, supra note 1 15, at 270-72.
23
- Caggiano, supra note 2, at 506. "(C)lassical norms of sovereignty come into direct conflict with the absolute
necessity to preserve Earth's delicate ecological balance." Gormley, supra note 23, at 93.
23 Only one case of environmental damage was successfully prosecuted at Nuremberg, that of Nazi administrators
charged with violation of the obligations of an occupying power by laying waste to Polish forests. See infra note
295 and accompanying text. Another case, based on a scorched earth defense, resulted in acquittal. U.S. v.
Wilhelm List, et al., United Nations War Crimes Commission, 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 69
(1949) (Nazi General Lothar Rendulic not guilty of destruction in Finnmark province of Norway).
235Consider the following: "(H)esitancy by the world community to enforce the law of war allows nations acting
under the guise of self-defense to wreak havoc on neighboring states." Caggiano, supra note 2, at 504.
236Sohn, supra note 81, at 13. Some would argue that this is no less true for the United States than for other
nations. It is especially unlikely that governments will impose self-restraints, particularly new and abstract ones,
during armed conflict. Almond, supra note 34, at 130. "The time has come to put aside fears of being judged, as
hard and as impractical as that may sound. Only in this way will a stable situation come to pass in the post-Cold
War era." Caggiano, supra note 2, at 506.
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As with war crimes, the enforcement of the law pertaining to environmental protection during
armed conflict will fail without a firm normative basis. Without a firm normative basis,
enforcement will be no more than "victor's justice."237 The winner and the loser must both be
accountable. Even-handed accountability builds respect and support for the law.
The International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind (1991) includes "Willful and Severe Damage to the Environment," a crime which is
"so vaguely defined that it fails any reasonable test of the 'principles of legality' under any of the
world's major criminal justice systems" and which "has no basis in conventional or customary
international law."238 Another proposal, a crime of "ecocide," is likewise unavailing at present;
this initiative is not yet recognized as international law.239 Neither are Articles 35 or 55 of
Protocol I likely to be used as a basis for war crimes prosecutions. 240
Post-conflict reparations are another inadequate means of enforcement or deterrence.
Once standard, war reparations have been rare since World War I,241 the U.N. claims commission
for Iraq notwithstanding. 242
B. The Aspects ofEffective Enforcement
1
.
Effective Enforcement of Environmental Protections During Armed Conflict Must
Include Deterrence, Prevention, and Punishment.
Anticipation of harm to the environment must be cultivated so that
measures can be taken before the activities affecting the environment cause
irreparable damaged
^ J See, e.g., Caggiano, supra note 2, at 505. "Environmentally harmful practices of the victors have in the past
proved almost impossible to stigmatize in any legally authoritative manner, that is by formal action that included
the assent of leading governments." Falk, supra note 20, at 81.
23
°Bassiouni. supra note 212, at 485.
T-5Q "
Caggiano, supra note 2, at 481 n.25. Ecocide, by one definition, constitutes the disruption or destruction, in
whole or in part, of a human ecosystem. Professor Falk recommends the adoption of such an offense - "Crimes
Against Nature" - into the law of armed conflict. Falk. supra note 20, at 94.
2
*"See Bothe. supra note 34. at 348.
Til *
Greenwood, supra note 227, at 7-8.
242Gupta, supra note 9, at 269-71.
24 Almond, supra note 43, at 310.
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The approach to environmental protection during armed conflict must be preventative
based on a philosophy of avoidance of irreversible, catastrophic, and permanent environmental
damage. 244 An effective enforcement scheme thus requires three things: deterrence, means to
preempt or preclude conduct which will cause environmental damage; prevention, means to halt
or reverse action which is causing environmental damage; and, punishment, means of establishing
culpability and accountability for environmental damage that has occurred. All three - deterrence,
prevention, and punishment - which have conceptual counterparts in the law of armed conflict,
are essential to achieve control over the actions of states at the time and place and in the manner
best-suited to protect the environment. 245
In all three instances "(t)he primary strategy with regard to the environment . . . [must be
to] establish control."246 Control must be based on the principle of limitation, "a concept which is
also important in the law of armed conflict."247 Establishing limitations on environmental damage
will translate into restraints on belligerents.248 The most important restraint may be deterrence of
the use of force itself 249 Some suggest that a failure of deterrence is a major cause of Iraqi
environmental devastation during the Gulf War. 250 Deterrence, like prevention and punishment,
requires both a normative system and an enforcement mechanism. 251
International law should also maximize the enforcement options and/ora available to it.
Several commentators recommend improvements to judicial processes. 252 Among the options
2 Simonds, supra note 8, at 219.
^"* JAlmond, supra note 43, at 299. "There are rising expectations that human activities that create severe harm to
the environment must be curtailed." Id. at 300.
Id. at 299. And see Harry H. Almond, Jr., International Environmental Law: The Impact and Implications of
Municipal Environmental Law, 2 ILSA J. INTL& Comp. L. 1, 3 (1995) ("The effectiveness of international
environmental law requires the exercise of authority, and even force, to ensure controls commensurate with the
prescriptions adopted").
24
'Baker, supra note 10, at 354.
^°See Caggiano, supra note 2, at 354-55. The limitations principle is also contained in the Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. Id. at 355.
?4q
Almond, supra note 43, at 320.
1 SO
Sharp, supra note 26. at 55.
251
/<Y. at 5. "Effective deterrence demands criminal responsibility and state accountability." Id. at 66.
M at 65 ("(T)he preferred option is prosecution by a tribunal under the cognizance of the Security Council. If
that is not possible, then the United States should be the moving force behind an international ad hoc tribunal
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available is the new permanent court now under consideration by the United Nations. 253 Another
suggestion is to use the court created by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 254
2. Preventative Remedies Are Especially Important in Environmental Matters Where No
Amount of Monetary Compensation May Be Adequate to Redress Environmental Destruction
and the Corresponding Deleterious Impact on Quality of Life.
There is a "growing awareness" that environmental damage "cannot be adequately
compensated in pecuniary terms, nor readily reversed or restored."255 Also, "the threat of post-
war financial obligations is not likely to deter states or their individual representatives from
engaging in environmental destruction during a war."256 Preventative remedies are peculiarly
important to environmental protection.
Take, for example, the destruction of species. Although millions of species have been
identified, the catalog of species is far from complete. The losses we may unknowingly suffer
from the extinction of species whose identity and human benefits we do not yet know may be
great. 2
-"* 7 Precautions must be taken.
The precautionary principle of international law holds that substances or activities harmful
to the environment should be regulated even if their full harmful effects have not been
conclusively demonstrated. 258 The principle advances the notion that prevention is preferable to
punishment in protecting the environment, reversing the traditional logic of the law that sanctions
convened in a manner similar to the tribunal convened at Nuremberg."); Simonds, supra note 8, at 210 ("(A) new
environmental convention is not really necessary if certain gaps in the law are filled. I suggest a third path:
reforming existing law and creating judicial review mechanisms to balance the competing considerations of
military necessity and environmental protection.").
See supra note 232.
TCI r
" Gasser. supra note 153; Leibler, supra note 6, at 80; Sharp, supra note 26, at 26.
_
Almond, supra note 43, at 313.
23
"Leibler. supra note 6. at 77. Thus, the state responsibility doctrine is not much of a deterrent. See infra part
V.C.I.
^J
"The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 437
U.S. 153, 178, 78 S.Ct. 2279, 2293 (1978) (quoting legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§1531 etseq).
25
°McClymonds, supra note 4. at 613. The sources of the precautionary principle are said to be Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration, id., and the 1985 Vienna Convention and 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting
emissions. Hickey & Walker, supra note 1 14, at 423. The principle is a rule of restraint. Id. at 426.
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may be imposed only after harm has occurred.259 Along with international environmental law in
general, this principle is expanding its focus from transboundary, to regional, and to global
concerns. 260 The principle is growing; it is emerging as an international obligation. 261
The law of armed conflict and international environmental law share common values.262
The "larger composite principle" of these bodies of law is "one and the same;" it is
"conservation."263 The former limits destruction. The latter limits exploitation (a consequence of
which may also be destruction). Both protect man. 264 The objectives? Protection of resources
for common use and exploitation; maintenance of the regenerative capacity of the environment;
and, promotion of the well-being of all. 265
PartV
What Is The Existing Law Relative To Protection Of The Environment
During Armed Conflict?
(l)nternational law, more by accident than by design, does impose a
degree of accountability (including individual accountability) for deliberate
wartime environmental damaged6
In this part we will review the law of armed conflict, humanitarian law, and international
environmental law, all of which are pertinent to environmental protection during armed
conflict. 267 Regarding the law of armed conflict, we will look at the principles of military
necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and humanity and at the Hague Convention No. IV
^-^McClymonds, supra note 4, at 615-19. Cf. The prevailing doctrine of sic utere which uses a post-delictual
approach. Hickey & Walker, supra note 1 14, at 427-29.
26t)Hickey & Walker, supra note 1 14, at 430.
261Mat437. 453.W 437,
262 Schafer, supra note 24, at 291.
263Id at 318.
26W.— la.
265Almond, supra note 43, at 309.
266
Leibler, supra note 6, at 132.
zo
'"Environmental damage during armed conflict involves two bodies of international law - the law of war and
environmental law." Simonds, supra note 8, at 166. Several detailed analyses of these bodies of law have already
been done. See generally Roach, supra note 13 for a good encapsulation and helpful bibliography. And see Sharp,
supra note 26; Leibler. supra note 6; and Simonds, supra note 8.
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Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 ("Hague Regulations").268
Regarding humanitarian law, we will look at the modern269 humanitarian conventions including
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949
("Fourth Geneva Convention")270 and the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, and Relating to the Protection of the Victims of International Conflicts, of 1977 ("Protocol
I"). 271 Regarding international environmental law, we will look at the principles of state
responsibility, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, the World Charter for Nature,272 and the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques of 1977 ("ENMOD Treaty"). We will see that certain environmental
damage during armed conflict is proscribed for two reasons: historically, to protect human beings;
and, more recently, to protect the environment in its own right. 273 We will note that the basic
precept of environmental protection during armed conflict - prevention of unjustified
environmental damage - devolves from the same principle of limitation that underlies humanitarian
law274 and environmental law. 275
268Hague ConvenUon Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (IV), Oct. 81, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.I.A.S. No. 539.
"Modern" in this context is construed to mean subsequent to the United Nations Charter of 1945.
710* '"1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
771
Protocol Additional to the Geneva ConvenUon of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of the
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977). Limited further support comes from the
i925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction; and, the 1980 Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. See Arthur H. Westing, Cultural Norms, War and
the Environment app. 2 (1988). The preamble to the Conventional Weapons Convention, recalling Protocol I,
provides: "(I)t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." The Environmental Impact of
War app. 2 (Glen Plant ed., 1992). Nuclear weapons and the treaties that regulate them also must be considered.
See Almond, supra note 34, at 178-79.
97?
*• ^World Charter for Nature, supra note 90.
771
Baker, supra note 10, at 351-52. "The traditional law governing the conduct of belligerents during war seeks
primarily to protect humans. It protects the natural environment only indirectly and inadequately. Although some
modern treaties specifically prohibit environmental damage, as a whole they are incomplete and are not widely
accepted." Simonds, supra note 8, at 168.
274Baker. supra note 10, at 354. See also Gasser, supra note 138. "Customary international law, in effect,
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A. The Customary Law of War
Protection of the environment under the law of armed conflict is a relatively new
phenomenon. 276 Even the United Nations Charter is silent on this point. 277 However, a variety
of environmental protections, old and new, express and extrapolated, may be found under the law
of armed conflict. 278
1 . Military Necessity; Proportionality, Discrimination; and, Humanity.
In the main, the customary international law of armed conflict is based on the four
principles of military necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and humanity. 279 Humanity is the
principle that unnecessary suffering should be avoided. 280 Discrimination is the principle that
combatants and non-combatants must be distinguished. 281 Proportionality is the principle that the
extent of armed force to be used must be reasonably related to a military objective for which the
use force is necessary. 282 Military necessity, the most important to environmental protection
compels commanders to consider potential environmental ramifications of combat actions and to weigh them
against the expected tactical advantage." Wilcox, supra note 25. at 304.
27:,
Baker. supra note 10, at 354-55.
" Diederich. supra note 10, at 143.
211
Id.
- A number of excellent treatments of this subject have already been done including Almond, supra note 34;
Sharp, supra note 26; and. Roach, supra note 13. See also Roberts, supra note 50. at 4-19. It will not be my
purpose here to duplicate them.
Caggiano. supra note 2, at 494 et seq. "(T)he inherent generality and vagueness with which these principles
are expressed exposes them to divergent interpretations and wholesale exploitation and avoidance." Leibler, supra
note 6, at 103. Does their "vast uncertainty" prevent them from "operating as effective deterrents during the course
of battle"? See id.
280
Leibler, supra note 6, at 100.
TO 1
Id. at 101 ("(T)he only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken
the military forces of the enemy."). See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 10.
2 2The 1987 ICRC Handbook of the Law of War for Armed Forces defines proportionality as "damage which is
[not] excessive in relation to the value of the expected result of the whole military operation." Leibler, supra note
6, at 99. Proportionality is more than economy of force and more than simple prudence. It is an objective criterion
used as a check on excessive violence. Caggiano, supra note 2, at 497. Does proportionality allow for greater
emironmental damage as a trade-off for a shorter war brought about by the application of decisive (overwhelming)
force? See Carruthers, supra note 64, at 49. For example, would a longer Gulf War have been preferable if the
"oil weapon" had not been used by Iraq? Could President Bush have raUonalized thousands of additional
American casualties in order to achieve cleaner skies and seas in the Middle East? Would the American public
have tolerated it? Would any country? Take, for example, the battle for Hue in 1968 in which U.S. Marines were
initially precluded from using hea\y weapons against this ancient cultural and religious center. The house-to-
house fighting that resulted caused Marine casualties to rise to such a level that the heavy weapons ban was lifted
and the city promptly secured. See Garrett, supra note 48, at 3.
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during armed conflict, is the principle that the use of force itself must be reasonably necessary to
achieve a legitimate military objective. 283
A frequent criticism of the military necessity doctrine is that it prohibits only that which
the most powerful nations find militarily wmiseful. 284 For example, while the United States
endorsed the renunciation of antipersonnel mines two years ago, it wants to continue to use these
weapons in the Persian Gulf Region and in Korea. 285 States want to maintain military capability
that they believe to be essential to their defense, at least until a new capability becomes
available.286
The malleability of the military necessity principle is an important part of its enduring
acceptance in customary international law287 and a reason why environmentalists and others
argue for limitations to be placed on it regarding environmental destruction during armed
conflict. 288 At present, the principle of military necessity is the "key operating standard" to
determine whether destruction of the environment during armed conflict is lawful.289 Some
TO"3
^OJ
"Military necessity is not established fact, but an interpretation." Caggiano. supra note 2, at 499. It is intended
as a self-restraint on the use of force, a justification for the use of force against actual military threats. Id. at 497.
It is a "minimum precondition" for the use of force. Leibler, supra note 6, at 98. It is not absolute, that is,
unaualifiedly superior to other considerations. Falk, supra note 20, at 83.
28
"*Falk. supra note 20, at 80 ("(W)hat dominant states find militarily useful in war is unlikely to be prohibited,
and, if it is, the prohibition is unlikely to be respected in the next war . . . ."). We must be careful to keep in mind,
however, that military necessity means significantly more than militarily useful. See Simonds. supra note 8, at
219. 'lot
Bradley Graham, Pentagon Prepared to Forgo Most Land Mine Use Except in Korea, Persian Gulf, Wash.
Post, Apr. 19, 1996, at A26; Associated Press, Clinton Rejects a Ban on Use ofLand Mines, Wash. Post, May 17,
1996, atA24.
28
"Graham, supra note 285.
LO Consider the following: "The laws of armed conflict are not subject to, or restricted by, the principle of military
necessity. Rather, the principle of military necessity is subject to, and restricted by, the laws of armed conflict."
Sharp, supra note 26, at 30.
^°°See, e.g., Caggiano, supra note 2, at 500 ("To leave determinations of military necessity solely in the hands of
the belligerent parties would transform a powerful international check against violence into an ineffectual appeal to
the conscience of a waning nation."). One view is that only the "overwhelming proportion" of "reasonably
expected damage" which "measurably contributes to the achievement of the desired military goal" should be
allowed. Leibler, supra note 6, at 104. Even under this standard, only "excessive environmental damage" would
be prohibited. Id. at 105.
^° 7Almond, supra note 43, at 334-35.
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believe that military necessity is overused as justification for environmental destruction. 290
Moreover, it may do little to stop environmental damage before it occurs. 291
2. The Hague Regulations.
The first modern codification of the laws of war, the Hague Regulations, provide that the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. 292 The Hague
Regulations also forbid the destruction of enemy property "unless such destruction ... be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."293 Note that the Hague Regulations apply only
to "property" of "the enemy" and not to the environment per se.294 The Hague Regulations also
impose an obligation on occupying forces to preserve property in occupied territory in the nature
of usufruct. 295
The Hague Regulations, along with the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I,
incorporate the principle of military necessity. 296 The Hague Regulations are criticized, however,
for their technical obsolescence to modern warfare297 and their lack of an enforcement
mechanism. 298 On the other hand, the preamble to the Hague Regulations contains the so-called
"Martens Clause."
1 Caggiano, supra note 2, at 496-97, 500. Another way of viewing it is as a matter of balance vice limitation.
Diederich, supra note 10, at 158.
*
'Simonds, supra note 8, at 170.
* Roach, supra note 13, at 1.
70"} r7JHague Regulations, art. 23(g) discussed in Simonds, supra note 8, at 170-71.
"Caggiano, supra note 2. at 486. Limitations on the destruction of property are circumscribed by the nature of
property itself i.e., such limitations do not apply to matter which is not property including ".
. . climate, the
atmosphere, the sea. and marine life ..." Leibler. supra note 6. at 105-106. Cf. Sharp, supra note 26, at 1
1
("When one considers the environment in its component parts as property of the enemy, this provision [Art. 23(g)]
offers substantial environmental protection").
2
- Baker, supra note 10, at 375; Roach, supra note 13, at 1; Sharp, supra note 26, at 1 1. Article 55 of the Hague
Regulations, (the anti-plunder provisions) was the basis for prosecution of the Nazi officials charged with
destruction of Polish forests. Caggiano, supra note 2, at 486-87.
2 Caggiano, supra note 2, at 488; Sharp, supra note 26, at 17.
2 Caggiano, supra note 2, at 494. None of today's major weapons systems - tanks, aircraft, ballistic and other
missiles, long-range naval and field artillery, to name a few - were in existence in 1907. Thus, a state's
responsibility under Article 3 of the Hague Regulations is affected by this limitation through operation of the
intertemporal rule.
TOO
^ Sharp, supra note 26, at 12.
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The "Martens Clause" provides that "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages
established among civilized nations, from the law of humanity, and the dictates of public
conscience."299 The clause and thus the Hague Regulations remain important because of this
grounding in customary international law. 300 That is, it "extends the law of war to states that
have failed to accede to recent developments in treaty law." 301 A similar clause is contained in
Article 1(2) of Protocol I. 302
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that the Hague Regulations are
declarator}' of customary international law. 303
B. Modern Conventional Humanitarian Law
1 . The Fourth Geneva Convention.
The Fourth Geneva Convention bars all destruction of property not absolutely necessary
for lawful military purposes. 304 The Convention also shields protected persons and their
property. 305 Here, too, the protection afforded is rooted in the concept of property. 306
Article 53 of the Convention provides:
Hague Regulations, supra note 268, preamble. In its entirety the clause reads: "Until a more complete code of
the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience."
"loo
Diederich, supra note 10, at 141. "If principles of international law derived from established custom include
environmental law, the Martens Clause goes a long way toward filling the gaps of the law of war vis-a-vis the
emironment. (T)he 'dictates of public conscience' portion of the Martens Clause similarly fills the gaps, as these
dictates 'certainly include environmental concerns'." Simonds, supra note 8, at 198.
i01
Falk. supra note 20, at 84.
302,i
Id.
Sharp, supra note 26, at 9.
- °"*Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 53 discussed in Simonds, supra note, 8 at 171-72. Another position is that this
convention is not customary7 international law because state practice is based only on compliance with the treaty-
based obligations themselves. Caggiano, supra note 2, at 493.
j05Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 270, art. 33. One suggestion is to treat the emironment the same as a
noncombatant person. Diederich. supra note 10, at 156-57. This is a conservation approach. Id. at 157.
306
Article 53 is to the same effect as Article 23 of the Hague Regulations with the additional limitation that it
applies only to occupied territory. Leibler, supra note 6, at 106. See also Falk. supra note 20, at 88. The ICRC
position is that this protection extends to the environment. See Roach, supra note 13, at 4.
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Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations
[emphasis added]. 307
The provisions of this convention are generally considered declaratory of customary
international law. 308
2. Protocol I.
Protocol I, a convention adopted but not ratified by the United States,309 addresses
environmental protections directly. 310 Part III (Methods and Means of Warfare, Combatant and
Prisoner-of-War Status), Section I (Methods and Means of Warfare), Article 35 provides, in part:
3
.
It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment [emphasis added]. 311
Correspondingly, Part IV (Civilian Population), Chapter III (Civilian Objects), Article 55
provides:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage [emphasis added]. This protection
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are
307
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 270, art. 53. Note the use of "absolutely necessary" vice necessary. Is
this a higher standard than "military necessity"? Might that be because the provision relates to noncombatants in
occupied territory?
Sharp, supra note 26. at 14.
Ratification of Protocol I by the United States appears unlikely. The treaty is not before the Senate. See
Bernard H. Oxman, Comment, Environmental Warfare, 22 Ocean Dev. & IntlL. 433, 434 n.6 (1991). A
reservation ("understanding") was filed upon acceptance in 1977 to the effect that the treaty was construed not to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. See Almond, supra note 34. at 167. Acceptance of a treaty imposes on a state
an obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until the state shall have
made clear its intention not to ratify the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May. 23, 1969, art.
18(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 63 A.J.I.L. 875, 8 I.L.M. 679.Tin
- ^Protocol I also has a number of indirect environmental protections including Article 48 (discrimination
principle), Article 51 (protection of the civilian population), Article 54 (protection of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population), Article 56 (protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces).
Article 57 (precautions in attack). Article 60 (demilitarized zones), Article 69 (provision for basic needs in
occupied territory), and Article 91 (stale responsibility). Plant, supra note 271.
Protocol I, art. 35.3 discussed in Simonds, supra, note 8 at 172-77. Art. 35 affords protection to the
environment in its own right. Cf. Art. 55 which grounds its protection of the environment in protections for
noncombatants. Bothe, supra note 34, at 345.
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intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisal are prohibited. 312
Articles 35 and 55 cover not only deliberate environmental damage but also that which is
reasonably foreseeable. 313 The difficulty with Articles 35 and 55 is in interpreting the conjunctive
phrase "widespread, long-term, and severe."314 Moreover, like the Fourth Geneva Convention
and the Hague Regulations, these articles do not apply to air and sea warfare not connected to
war on land and they do not apply to conflicts of a non-international character. 315 Protocol I is
also criticized for its lack of "workable standard[s]" for military commanders,316 and because it is
too restrictive of militarily necessary destruction and thus renders military commanders
susceptible to prosecution for merely incidental damage. 317
Protocol I, which entered into force in 1978 and was recently ratified by Great Britain,318
appears destined for near universal acceptance and recognition as customary international law. 319
TIT
-
'^Protocol I. supra note 271, art. 55. See discussion in Carruthers. supra note 64, at 47-48 and Gasser, supra
note 138, at 638. A violation of Art. 55 is a grave breach under Article 85. Baker, supra, note 10 at 378-79.
Bothe. supra note 34, at 345. "Article 55 reinforces the implication of Art. 35 that care must be taken to avoid
collateral catastrophic effects on the natural environment resulting from such methods or means of warfare
employed for purposes other than causing such effect on the environment." Id. at 345-46. The problem is its
ambiguity. Almond, supra note 34, at 130. These articles "are intended to prohibit extreme environmental
damage" not that "normally" incidental to "battlefield damage." Leibler, supra note 6, at 111.
3 14Only the element of duration was discussed at any length during the drafting phase; no further explanation or
definition was agreed to. Bothe, supra note 34, at 346. "It appeared to be a widely shared assumption that
battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfares would not normally be proscribed by this provision." Id.
"[Articles 35.3 and 55] would affect such unconventional means of warfare as the massive use of herbicides or
chemical agents . . . ." Id. at 348. Some sentiment was expressed that the terms widespread, long-term, and severe
should be interpreted independently of the similar but disjunctive terms in the ENMOD Treaty. Id. at 347-48. Is
the_standard too high to serve a preventative function? See Simonds, supra note 8, at 174-75.
Carruthers. supra note 64, at 47; Simonds, supra note 8, at 171, 184-85. "Neither of these two bodies of law
[the law of war and environmental war] adequately address environmental damage to communal areas in non-
international armed conflicts or in warfare at sea or in the air." Simonds, supra note 8, at 187. Where the conflict
occurs, e.g., occupied territory, neutral territory, or at sea. has a significant bearing on what law applies. Id. at
170.
Sharp, supra note 26, at 16. "The chief faults of these provisions are their failure to establish a dividing line
between military and civilian objects and their failure to firmly prohibit a certain level of destruction. These
provisions thus do not provide armed forces or reviewing tribunals with clear rules of conduct." Simonds, supra
noteS, at 176.
Caggiano. supra note 2. at 491.
3 l
°See Robert S. Tully, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949: An Analysis ofthe Continuing
Validity of United States Military Objections to Ratification in the Post-Cold War Era 142 (1995) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, The George Washington University). Marine Lieutenant Colonel Tully argues that the military
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As the Protocol already enjoys wide acceptance as conventional law among many nations
including such large and powerful nations as China, Germany, and Russia, the "widespread, long-
term and severe" standard already regulates relations among the majority of nations. 320 The U.S.
position is that these articles are "too broad and ambiguous" to constitute customary international
law. 321
Uncertain is whether breaches of Articles 35 or 55 are "grave breaches" under article 85
which will give rise to criminal responsibility. 322 A grave breach under Article 85 is a willful
violation of the Protocol which causes "death or serious injury to body or health." 323 Grave
breaches constitute war crimes. 324 Collateral environmental damage which is not willfully caused
and which results only in minor health effects would thus not be a grave breach.
reasons for U.S. objections to the protocol have changed fundamentally since the collapse of the former Soviet
Union. Id. at 141. Moreover, the objections as to Articles 35 and 55 are limited. Baker, supra note 10, at 382.
Thus, the U.S. should reconsider its position vis-a-vis ratification as Great Britain recently did. See also Gasser,
supra note 153.
Gupta, supra note 9, at 260 ("[Articles 35 and 55] have been accepted as incorporated into customary
international law.") (citing works by Professor Almond and Ms. Okordudu-Fubara). Accord Sharp, supra note 26,
at 18, 43. Cf. Leibler, supra note 6, at 112 ("(I)t is difficult to understand how a provision could represent a norm
of customary international law when there is such extensive disagreement about the meaning of its central
elements."); and Simonds, supra note 8, at 177 ("(C)ommentators treat articles 35.3 and 55 as 'progressive
development' rather than as customary international law"). But cf. "The Protocols are an integral part of the
Geneva law, the most established body of wartime rules. The Protocols thus represent the most widely accepted
and direct path to protecting the environment during war." Id. at 211.
320But consider the following: "When states turn to the use of armed force in their relations, it is evident that they
believe that there is no other remedy or measure available to resolve their disputes or claims. Once they have
turned to the use of force it is also evident that they will not be concerned with protecting the environment, and for
this reason, the provisions in Protocol 1 are hortatory." Almond, supra note 34, at 136.
321 Simonds, supra note 8, at 177; Roberts, supra note 50, at 22-25.
Baker, supra note 10. at 378-79; Leibler, supra note 6, at 1 16; Simonds, supra note 8, at 200. The
consequences of breach under this convention, a creature of humanitarian law, compared to the consequences of
breach under the ENMOD Treaty, a creature of international environmental law, are significant. Leibler. supra
note 6, at 1 10. Professor Falk contends that violations of these articles are not grave breaches and thus cannot be
punished as war crimes. Falk, supra note 20, at 93. The ICRC position is that they are grave breaches. See
Roach, supra note 13, at 4.
-3T-3JZJ
Protocol I. supra note 271, art. 85.3, 85.4. Environmental damage is not listed.
324Protocol I, supra note 271, art. 85.5. "States shall repress grave breaches." Id. art. 86. 1.
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C. International Environmental Law
International environmental law is a discipline that barely existed a mere quarter century
ago. Beginning with the tentative enunciation by an arbitral tribunal of state responsibility for
transboundary pollution in The Trail Smelter Case-*25 and accelerating rapidly after the 1972
Stockholm Declaration,326 international environmental law is now the subject of dozens of
conventions, declarations of leading international organizations, and codification efforts. 327
Environmental protection has been institutionalized in some way into nearly every political
system. 328 Its aspirational consensus is represented by the twenty-seven points of the 1992 Rio
Declaration.329
Like domestic environmental law, international environmental law is crisis-driven and fear-
induced. 330 Nothing spurs the growth of law like disaster, and in the last three decades the global
environment experienced one highly-publicized disaster after another. 331 Human health threats of
enormous urgency, from toxic waste, to foul air and burning rivers, and many, many more,
brought environmental law center stage, part of a worldwide "political awakening." 332
Environmental law became in a very short time one of the major fields of international law. 333
Some argue that customary international environmental law already recognizes a duty to protect
the environment from hostile modification and from "devastating effects of modern warfare. 334
325The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.) 3 Rep. Intl Arb. Awards, 1905 (1949).
See Gormley. supra note 23, at 98.
David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law andAmerican Environmental Law,
32 Va. J. Intl L. 377, 381-86 (1992). Stimulated by criticism of environmental practices during the Vietnam
War. international law has begun to reverse the "virtual environmental unconsciousness" in the law of armed
conflict. Falk, supra note 20, at 86.
328Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1488-89.
J
^ Rio Declaration, supra note 89.
330See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Pollution Law 29 (1995); Harvard Law Review, supra, note 100 at 1487-88.
331A partial list of the best known and most devastating man-made disasters includes the Bhopal cyanide release
(1984), the Chernobyl release of radioactivity (1986), the Sandoz fire (Rhine River chemical spill) (1986), and the
Exxon Valdez spill (1989). McClymonds, supra note 4, at 585.
32Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1487.
333Wirth. supra note 327, at 377-79.
J Ji+McClymonds, supra note 4, at 626. Characterized by one commentator as "the International Law of
Environmental Protection," customary international law is said to include, state responsibility for transboundary
pollution; the obligation not to use one's territory in a manner harmful to other states (the sic utere principle);
pollution of another country may constitute "ecological aggression"; the right of an injured state to seek
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For all its advances, however, international law remains handicapped by lack of enforcement,
attributed by one commentator to the "empty abstraction" of the doctrine of state liability. 335
1
. State Responsibility.
States are responsible for their actions which result in environmental damage to other
states.
336 The liability is civil and, in cases of "massive pollution," may be criminal as well. 337
Reparations are the standard civil remedy.338 The concept is based on protection of the interests
of states, not global interests or the environment as such. 339 State responsibility is adjudicated
either by an international tribunal or by decision of the U.N. Security Council. 340
State responsibility continues to apply during armed conflict. 341 States may invoke
distress and necessity as a defense. 342 Self-defense343 is different; it is not a defense to
reparations: the right to stop harmful pollution by means of economic sanctions and reprisals where appropriate;
the right to pollute res communes is "not unfettered"; res nullius is irrelevant, i.e., states must consider the
assimilative capacity of a medium when introducing a pollutant; and, special sensitivity is required in regard to the
natural and cultural heritage of other states. Schafer, supra note 24, at 299-300.
335Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1498-1504.
33
"Almond, supra note 34, at 160. "[A] state may not engage in or approve of activities which present such grave
threats to the environment that human life is likely to be imperiled, and must take 'reasonable steps' to prevent such
harm. This duty may depend on the nature and foreseeability of the environmental harm." Schwartz, supra note
4, at 8. See also Simonds, supra note 8, at 191-92. Both Article 3 of the Hague Regulations and Article 91 of
Protocol I contain state responsibility provisions. Hague Regulations, supra note 268; Protocol I, supra note 271.
j3 Almond, supra note 34, at 160. Every internationally wrongful act entails international responsibility. An
international crime constitutes a serious breach of an international obligation essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community. Id. Massive air and water pollution may constitute an
international crime. Baker, supra note 10, at 356. See also Articles 19.2 and 19.3 of the International Law
Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in Henkin, supra note 24, at 559. Cf. Simonds,
supra note 8, at 201 ("Although the Draft Code does not reflect customary international law, it does suggest
possible future directions for liability."). Query whether the U.N. Security Council is willing or able to take
effective enforcement action? Henkin, supra note 24, at 560. And see infra note 346 and accompanying text.
33
Leibler, supra note 6, at 73-74.
Jjy
Id. at 75 ("(O)nly those states which suffer environmental damage will be able to invoke the responsibility of
the offending state to make reparation").
34 Simonds, supra note 8, at 199.
-511 r
x
Leibler, supra note 6, at 75.
342
Id. at 76.
343See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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environmental damage but only a justification for the use of force. 344 Self-defense, however, may
be a necessary predicate to distress and necessity. 345
Environmental damage may constitute unlawful aggression under Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter. 346 Failure to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of Article
2(4) will give rise to state responsibility. 347 Acts which constitute "waging a war of aggression"
will give rise not only to state responsibility but also to individual criminal responsibility for
"crimes against peace."348
Historically, acts of a state taken in lawful self-defense did not constitute an "international
delinquency, no matter how injurious . . . [they] may actually be to another state."349 As a result
of the Corfu Channel Case and the Stockholm Declaration, this "nonliability" "view" is now
considered "moribund."350 The modern trend is toward strict liability for even lawfully caused
environmental damage. 351
•
"^Leibler. supra note 6, at 75.
345M
-
"*°U. N. CHARTFRart. 2, % 4; And see Baker, supra note 10, at 356 ("(T)ransboundary environmental damage
occurring in war could be argued to have effects similar to the use of force. This is especially true if the damage is
deliberately directed against an opponent, but would also apply in cases of collateral damage affecting belligerents,
neutrals, or the acting state's own environment"). Article 2(4) "not only corresponds to customary international
law," but may also "[belong] to the realm ofjus cogens." Leibler, supra note 6, at 87. Paragraph 16 of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687 (the Gulf War cease-fire resolution) is said to provide additional support for the
proposition that environmental damage may constitute an unlawful use of force. Id. at 88. The question is one of
degree. "Small-scale environmental damage" will not constitute unlawful aggression, while "severe damage" may.
Id. at 89-90. The "requisite quantum of damage" is unclear, however. Id. That environmental damage may
constitute unlawful aggression and thus a threat to peace under Chapter VTJ of the U.N. Charter is important
because it potentially invokes the obligation of the Security Council to take military action to redress the breach of
peace. Id. at 90-92.
3
Leibler, supra note 6, at 87.
Id. Crimes against peace, like violations ofjus cogens, enjoy universal jurisdiction. Id. at 92.
Okordudu-Fubara. supra note 2, at 207 (quoting Oppenheim). "If environmental damage is inflicted by a state
in the course of a lawful use of force, then it cannot amount to a prohibited 'use of force,' a *breach of peace,' or a
'crime against peace.' In such circumstances, even the most severe acts of deliberate environmental destruction
will escape liability under the jus ad bellum regime." Leibler, supra note 6, at 95. Note that that part of the law of
armed conflict w hich pertains to the use of force during armed conflict (jus in bello) applies even to armed conflict
which is unlawful under thejus ad bellum. Id. at 96.
3!,0Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 208.
JJl




2. The Stockholm Declaration.
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 provides:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits life of dignity and
well-being. 352
The Declaration does not apply directly to armed conflict, but it reinforces other
protections under customary international law. 353 It implies that war in general is not inherently
destructive to the environment, that only weaponry of mass destruction is. 354 As we have seen,




The Rio Declaration which followed the Stockholm Declaration by 20 years provides:
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in
times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary. 356
And further:
The environment and natural resources of people under . . occupation
shall be protected. 357
The Rio Declaration, which also requires that states give notice of environmentally
harmful activities,358 is said to distinguish between environmental protection in peacetime and
environmental protection during armed conflict. 359 It is feared that Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration which reiterates Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, may lead to
overwhelming liability for all parties to a conflict. 360 The operative language is:
is?
Stockholm Declaration, Principle I, reprinted in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 10.
353
Faik, supra note 20, at 87 (Principle 21).
354W. (Principle 26) ("Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other
means of mass destruction.").
JJJSee supra part II.A.




Id. (Principles 18 and 19).
Simonds. supra note 8, at 192.
JOURio Declaration, supra note 89. Principle 2; Simonds, supra note 8, at 192.
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdictions or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or ofareas beyond the limits ofnationaljurisdiction [emphasis added]. 361
Interpreted literally, this language imposes responsibility for environmental damage during armed
conflict even when such damage is justified under the law of armed conflict and humanitarian law,
and imposes responsibility for incidental damage to res communes. Many states are wary of
exposing themselves to this type of liability and would therefore object to the recognition of these
provisions as customary international law. 362
4. The World Charter for Nature.
The World Charter for Nature of 1 982 is important for several reasons. Perhaps the most
important, conceptually, is the recognition in the Charter that mankind's relation to the
environment has changed from exploitation to conservation. Article III of the Charter provides
that "(a)ll areas of the earth, both land and sea, shall be subject to these principles of conservation;
special protection shall be given to unique areas, to representative samples of all the different
types of ecosystems and to the habitats of rare or endangered species." 363 Article V provides:
"Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare and other hostilities."364 Article
XX states: "Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided." 365
The Charter, adopted as U.N. General Assembly Resolution 37/17, is "not inherently
binding," but does "constitute further evidence supporting the applicability of the general principle
361 Rio Declaration, supra note 89, Principle 21. N.B. Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States is to the same effect. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 601.
362See supra parts II. A. 1 and IV.A.3.
363World Charter for Nature, supra note 90, art. 3. Conservation of the marine environment is prescribed by
Articles 192 and 193 of the Law of the Sea Convention. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 1.L.M. 1261
(1982). Many other conservation-oriented treaties exist See, e.g., Harlow, supra note 48, at 8.
364World Charter for Nature, supra note 90, art. 5. See also Arthur H. Westing, Cultural Norms, War and
the Environment app. 3 (1988).
365World Charter for Nature, supra note 90, art. 20.
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in wartime."366 The only state in active opposition to the Charter was the United States, one of
its original proponents. 367
The normative assertions of the Charter, though not themselves sufficient, build support
for strengthening international law through "a comprehensive regulatory framework which is the
outcome of a multinational law-making process." 368 One principle of customary international law
that may be developing from the Charter is that "nature is no longer fair game in mankind's
conflicts."369 This hardly provides greater specificity, but it is normatively significant.
5. The ENMOD Treaty
The ENMOD Treaty of 1977, which arose out of the U.S. use of mechanical and chemical
defoliants and cloud-seeding techniques in Vietnam,370 and was concluded shortly before
Protocol I, proscribes hostile use of environmental modification techniques having "widespread,
long-lasting or severe [emphasis added]" effects. 371 The treaty does not protect the environment
from damage or destruction as such,372 rather it places limitations on its hostile (but not
peaceable) use. 373 Binding on the signatories only, the ENMOD Treaty is not considered
customary international law. 374
366
Leibler. supra note 6, at 75.
367
Falk. supra note 20, at 87.
368M
369Sharp, supra note 26, at 29.
Caggiano. supra note 2, at 488. Environmental modification was "widely perceived" at the time as a weapon
whose use would increase as technology improved. Leibler, supra note 6, at 93-94. However, as with
environmental modification for hostile purposes generally, the U.S. efforts in Indochina were largely ineffectual.
Westing, supra note 2, at 5. Query, if environmental modification is ineffectual will it not frequently fail the tests
of military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination? See supra part V.A. 1.
371ENMOD Treaty, supra note 71, art. 1.1. In full, article 1.1 provides: "Each State Party to this Convention
undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party."
Id. Note the disjunctive use of "or" vice "and" as in Protocol I, arts. 35, 55. See Simonds, supra note 8, at 185-87
and Caggiano, supra note 2, at 488-91.
Sharp, supra note 26, at 20; Gupta, supra note 9, at 262.
373Simonds, supra, note 8 at 187. Hostile environmental modification below the levels of widespread, long-
lasting or severe is not prohibited. Caggiano, supra note 2, at 489. Non-hostile modification even above the
threshold is also not prohibited. Id. The term "environmental warfare" has been used to describe hostile
environmental modification, a form of unconventional warfare. Okordudu-Fubara. supra note 2. at 144.
374
Morris, supra note 5, at 775-77; Gupta, supra note 9, at 262.
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The treaty is criticized because it is vague,375 it prohibits only that which is militarily
unattractive376 and because its enforcement mechanism - complaint to the U.N. Security Council
via a Consultative Committee of Experts - is unwieldy. 377 Some suggest that the treaty avoids the
more fundamental question whether "any hostile modification of the environment or any amount
of damage caused by such modification should be tolerated at all."378
Part VI
How Can Existing Law Be Strengthened And Enforced?
In this part we explore how and why military force might be used to deter, prevent or
punish unjustified environmental damage during armed conflict and thereby strengthen existing
law. We will see how the U.S. Armed Forces have assimilated an environmental ethic379 and
how U.S. foreign policy has institutionalized environmental values by embracing the concept of
environmental security. We will also see how armed forces are well-suited and well-situated to
take timely action to protect the environment during armed conflict. Having concluded that
armed forces are capable of effective environmental protection during armed conflict, we will
determine the threshold or necessary preconditions for the use of armed force. We will describe
how the Protocol I standard of widespread, long-term, and severe might be utilized and how the
ENMOD Treaty definitions of these terms might be adapted for customary use.
J JWidespread is defined as "encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers." Long-
lasting is defined as "a period of months, or approximately a season." Severe is defined as "involving serious or
significant disruption or harm to human life, natural or economic resources or other assets." Simonds, supra note
8 at 186. Recall that these definitions are strictly limited to this treaty. Id. And see Leibler, supra note 6, at 1 10.
3
"Caggiano. supra note 2, at 489 n.71. But since "most wartime environmental damage results from attacks
against enemy forces and not from attempts to modify the environment, the treaty is not likely to have much
practical application. Most of the prohibited techniques are militarily unrealistic anyway" Simonds, supra note 8.
at 187.
Morris, supra note 5, at 776 n.4; Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 210-11.
378
Josef Goldblat, The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977: An Analysis, in Environmental
Warfare. A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal 57 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).
3
In this context, "environmental ethic" means a policy of self-restraint against environmental destruction.
Diederich, supra note 10. at 156.
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A. Why Military Force
Modern combat with nuclear weapons, persistent toxic chemicals and long
lived contamination such as dioxins, and unexploded ordinances [sic] can have
impacts over generations. Many of us have seen the characterization of "sick
humor" of the lone soldier standing in the midst ofArmageddon declaring, "We
won. " (W)e have reached the point in our warfighting capability where we must
consider the consequences as we develop and use . . . sophisticated weapons. We
must also be very cognizant of the abilities ofour enemies because as was proven
in [the Athenian desecration of the Theban temple at] Delium [in 424 B.C.], not
everyonefollows the rides?*®
1. U.S. Armed Forces Have Assimilated an Environmental Ethic.
Military forces are the instrument of government's first duty, the protection of its lands and
citizens. Known perhaps more infamously for their aggressive rather than defensive use, military
forces have evolved as armed conflict has evolved, as have expectations concerning the justifiable
use of armed force. The history of war (and the law of war) is the history of society's values,
values sooner-or-later imprinted on the military establishment. 381
The Clean Air and Water Acts, the Endangered Species and Marine Mammal Protection
Acts, the National Environmental Policy Act, and a host of other statutes impose environmental
obligations on the U.S. Armed Forces, 382 as do a number of international treaties and the laws of
the many nations where U.S. Armed Forces are forward deployed. 383 The Department of
Defense with its millions of employees is a major landholder which engages in a multitude of
military, industrial, and commercial activities that make it one of the largest environmentally
JOUFinch, supra note 36, at 3. An unexploded ordinance is a lawyer's time-bomb.
Diederich, supra note 10, at 156.
382
See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. pt. 188 (Environmental Effects in the United States ofDOD Actions). Recall that wartime
exceptions may pertain to peacetime statutes. See supra note 123. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
treat the issue in any detail, one should note that domestic environmental law impacts military training and
operations to a far greater extent than does international law. Although some domestic environmental statutes
have war or naUonal emergency exceptions, and certain others speak even more vaguely of emergency situations,
for combat operations abroad the Department of Defense does not routinely request the President to grant statutory
relief. The strictures of compliance with domestic environmental law during armed conflict may thus place U.S.
Armed Forces at a disadvantage when facing a foe who is not similarly constrained. The capability, mobility, and
flexibility of the Armed Forces cannot be properly assessed without understanding the compound effects of
domestic and international law.
383
See, e.g.. Exec. Order No. 12,1 14, cited in Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey. 986 F.2d 528 (DC. Cir.
1993). Cf. NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F.Supp. 466 (D. D.C. 1993).
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regulated institutions in the world. The U.S. Armed Forces find themselves, their activities, and
their installations monitored and policed by a vast array of international, foreign, federal, and
state agencies, authorities, and commissions. In short, the military services have gone "green."
Part of the "greening" of the military services is the introduction of an environmental ethic,
a sense of stewardship for natural resources and the environment. 384 In simple ways such as
instituting recycling programs, to more complex undertakings like structuring militarily useful
training exercises to avoid taking endangered species and marine mammals,385 the U.S. Armed
Forces have taken up the environmental cause with characteristic military efficiency. 386
Moreover, the environmental impact of military operations and armed conflict is a matter with
which the services are already concerned, as evidenced inter alia by last September's Naval War
College Symposium.
2. U.S. Foreign Policy Has Institutionalized Environmental Values.
During a recent visit to Brazil's rain forests, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
remarked: "(T)he environment is essential to the health, security and prosperity of not only the
American people but people all around the world."387 In a February 1996 memo to senior State
Department aides Secretary Christopher laid out the policy of the Clinton Administration relative
to environmental security, placing the environment near the top of U.S. national security
interests. 388 The national security strategy, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (February 1995), states:
3
°"\See, e.g., Robert E. Linhard, Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military
Operations 1-2 (Undated) (paper presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The
Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law
and Policy Dep't, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, PJ).
38
-/c/. at 3 (protection of the red cockaded woodpecker from tank training at Ft. Bragg, NC).
38
"See, e.g., Na\>y Environmental Manual, supra note 170, ^j 3 ("The Navy is committed to operating in a manner
compatible with the environment. National defense and environmental protection are and must continue to be
compatible goals. Therefore, an important part of the Navy's mission is to prevent pollution, protect the
environment, and protect natural, historic, and cultural resources.").
Thomas A. Lippman, On Amazon, Christopher Stands Upfor Environment, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1996, at A9.
388/d. The posture is not merely a Democratic (vice Republican) one. During the Bush Administration,
Secretary of State James Baker also espoused the importance of environmental security in U.S. foreign policy.
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Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking,
environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth
and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long-term
American policy. In addition, an emerging class of transnational environmental
issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present
new challenges to U.S. strategy [emphasis added]. 389
This new concept - environmental security - is thus an inextricable aspect of national
security. 390 It underscores how even in peacetime environmental degradation can undermine the
stability and security of individual nations, regions, and the larger world community. 391 As a
nation we must respond to this threat with a combined political, military, and economic
approach. 392
As an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, the Armed Forces must be environmentally-
conscious and compliant not only in their day-to-day non-combat operations, they must also
"externalize" environmental awareness, that is, make the environment part of their strategic,
operational, and tactical thinking and planning for armed conflict. 393
Michael J. Kane. Promoting Political Rights to Protect the Environment, 18 Yale J. Lntl L. 389, 410-1 1 (1992).
This article is one of the scries arising from the April 1992 Yale symposium entitled "Earth Rights and
Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental Protection." "(S)ources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security." Baker, supra note 10, at 356.
TOOJoyA National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 1 (The White House Feb. 1995). And see
Almond, supra note 43, at 3 19.
3
""In all cases, the nature of our response [to external threats] must depend on what best serves our own long-
term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements,
start with our physical defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the
security of values achieved through the expansion of the community of democratic nations." National Security
Strategy, supra note 389, at 7. "(S)ecurity, even in the traditional sense, can be ensured only if security in the
environmental sense is emphasized. Brunnee, supra note 17, at 1742.
31 National Security Strategy, supra note 389, at 18. The concept has two elements: maintaining ecological
balance and preventing conflict. Brunnee, supra note 17, at 1742.
2National Security Strategy, supra note 389, at 33. "The Clinton administration plans to allocate hundreds of
millions of dollars to international environmental programs in 1997, officials said, even though Congress has
reduced funds for diplomatic activities and foreign aid. U.S. diplomats at key embassies will be reassigned to
natural resource and environment issues." Thomas W. Lippman, Christopher Puts Environment High on
Diplomatic Agenda: Abuse ofNatural Resources Imperils U.S. Interests, Secretary ofState Says, Wash. Post,
Apr. 15, 1996, at A10. "I have great confidence [Secretary Christopher said in an interview] that as we move into
the 21st century, the nexus between security and the environment will become even more apparent." Id.
Cooperation rather than competition should be the focus for environmental issues. Brunnee, supra note 17, at
1742. And see infra note 418 and accompanying text.
See Harry D. Croft, A Mew Element ofNational Security: Military Forces in Environmental Protection, 1993
Executive Research Project A105 4, 8-9, 1 1 (Industrial College of the Armed Forces 1993). And see supra part
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3. Armed Forces Are Best Suited and Best Situated to Take Timely Action During
Armed Conflict.
It is a far cry from domestic environmental law compliance to enforcement of the law
pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict. Should Army Rangers be dropped
into the Amazon to stop the burning of the rainforests because of the potential harm to our
environmental security? Should the Air Force strike coal-fired electric power plants in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to stop the emission of pollutants harmful to U.N. peacekeeping forces? Should the
Navy sink illegal whaling ships of former enemies? The very suggestion of military "enforcement"
of international law evokes a specter of these and other potential excesses.394
The U.S. Armed Forces are not law enforcement agencies;395 they are organized, trained,
and equipped for successful combat operations. But more and more, military forces are called
upon to maintain order and stability by limited means and measures, such as separation of warring
factions until diplomatic solutions can be achieved. In this limited capacity, commonly placed
under the rubric of peacekeeping, the military's objective is a peaceful political solution, not a
military one. Deterrence, not swift and decisive combat action is the modus operandi.
No effective mechanism for the prevention of unjustified environmental damage during
armed conflict can be constructed that does not include the major protagonists, the combatant
forces themselves. Environmental destruction caused by hostile armed forces is best deterred,
prevented, and punished by other armed forces. In this context, corresponding force is the most
credible remedy.
In theaters of armed conflict, a vacuum of civil authority frequently exists, a vacuum
created by the disruption of governmental institutions and the interruption of normal legal
III.B.l.
jy
~*N.B. Two of the three examples (Army and Navy) do not involve immediate armed conflict. The third example
(Air Force) involves armed conflict in which the U.S. is involved only as a peacekeeper, now under the Davton
peace accords.
395The Posse Comitatus Act strictly limits use of the Armed Forces in domestic law enforcement: "Whoever,
except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
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processes. The military is often the only institution capable of filling this vacuum, of addressing
the problem of environmental damage at the time and place it is most likely to occur. However
effective diplomatic and juridical remedies may be, they are ex post facto. A more immediate
capability is needed.
Another beneficial effect of the use of military force to deter, prevent, or punish unjustified
environmental damage during armed conflict is the internalization of the costs of environmental
damage to the responsible state. 396 The high price a state may have to pay for unjustified
environmental damage may itself be a credible deterrent. A swift and sure military response to
unjustified environmental damage may dissuade the responsible state and other states from similar
actions in the future. The high cost of violation may give pause to reconsider compliance.
B. The Thresholdfor Use ofArmed Force
1. The Protocol I Standard: Widespread, Long-term, and Severe.
The Protocol I "widespread, long-term and severe" standard, despite its shortcomings, is
the best available guideline. 397 Not only does it already enjoy broad-based acceptance as
conventional law, it correlates well with the principle of self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. 398 This is the standard that should be incorporated into military
doctrine, both as it relates to intentional and reasonably foreseeable environmental damage which
is not justified by military necessity.
Chances are that the standard will be invoked frequently. As one commentator put it:
An act of environmental warfare of any consequence such that its effects
generate any attention nationally, regionally, or globally, would rarely fail to satisfy
at least one of the stipulated thresholds of "widespread," "long-lasting," or
39
"Diederich, supra note 10, at 138; Harvard Law Review, supra note 100, at 1550. And see Rio Declaration
supra note 89, Principle 16.
Cf. Simonds, supra note 8, at 211 (use ENMOD Treaty disjunctive standard). And see supra note 141.
39
°Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 51.
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"severe" and would probably satisfy two or all three requirements as demonstrated
by the Persian Gulf environmental warfare.399
Admittedly, it will be difficult to evaluate these criteria during actual combat when scientific
environmental assessment may be impossible or prohibitively impractical.
The obvious examples are the easy ones to evaluate. The hardest are those that while
foreseeable were unintentional. It is in these cases that the vagaries of the current thresholds are
most pronounced. Only over time will these ambiguities be clarified by state practice. As norms
pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict evolve and the practices of armed
forces change, the parameters of these thresholds will become clearer and give better guidance to
states and military commanders.
The Protocol I standard must be interpreted in conjunction with the principle of military
necessity and the other relevant provisions of the law of armed conflict, humanitarian law, and
international environmental law. The scale of environmental damage is important (whether it
meets the threshold); the justification for it is equally so. Protocol I thus cannot stand on its own.
It offers a workable standard but ignores the underlying justification for the use of force.
As noted previously, the law differs depending on the nature of the conflict, where it
occurs, and who is affected by the action in question.400 The Protocol I standard should also be
applied to non-international conflicts, such as that which occurred in the former Yugoslavia, and
to air and sea warfare.401
2. The ENMOD Treaty Definitions.
Although the definitions of "widespread, long-lasting, or severe" accompanying the
ENMOD Treaty are intended only for the purposes of that treaty, they do offer a basis for
construing the terms "widespread, long-term, and severe" under Protocol I, not in the sense of
399Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 181. N.B. This is the ENMOD Treaty disjunctive standard, but the same
will often be true of the Protocol I conjunctive standard.
40
"See supra note 3 1 5 and accompaming text.




precedent or binding authority, but in the nature of relevant facts. Thus, certain environmental
damage whose effects will last considerably less than a season, e.g., a few weeks, may still be
found to be long-term. For instance, were a chemical plant like the Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, India destroyed intentionally during war for no other purpose than ostensibly to terrorize
the civilian population, the fatal effects of the release of methyl-isocyanate might be considered
"long-term." Even though the gas will dissipate quickly, the resulting health effects (fatalities and
permanent injuries) will endure for years 402
C. Employment ofMilitary Forces
1. Deterrence.
In this section we will look at how armed force may be used to deter unjustified
environmental damage during armed conflict. As we have seen, the law of armed conflict,
humanitarian law, and international environmental law provide a basis to protect the environment
from certain unjustified environmental damage during armed conflict. 403 We have also seen that
armed force can be used as an enforcement mechanism.404 How is this to be done? Alternative
approaches must be developed to address the situations where the United States405 is already a
combatant, seeks to intervene in an on-going or threatened conflict, or participates in a
peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the United Nations.
402Lingering groundwater contamination outside the former Bhopal Union Carbide plant continues to effect the
health of the remaining inhabitants and their livestock as well as crop yields. Kenneth J. Cooper, Slums Sprawl in
Shadow ofBhopal Gas Leak: Indians Eke Out Living 12 Years After Disaster Despite Suspected Contamination of
Water, Soil, Wash. Post, June 27, 1996, at A19.
JSee supra part V.
404 See supra part VI. A.
405The United States was selected for illustrative purposes because the U.S. Armed Forces are uniquely qualified
to take a leading role in developing this area of the law. However, the illustrations and conclusions would apply
equally to the armed forces of any other country or alliance, e.g., NATO. See Dieter Fleck, Protection of the
Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations: The Way Ahead 7-8 (Undated) (paper
presented to the September 1995 Naval War College Symposium entitled "The Protection of the Environment
During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations") (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI).
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Whatever cautions may be raised against the use of armed force as a mechanism for
enforcement of the law pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict, few
enforcement tools are more immediate, direct, and compelling than armed force. Fortunately,
self-restraint characterizes the most powerful nations' use of military force better than unbridled
aggression. Within this context a legal regime permitting properly limited, tailored uses of force
for environmental protection is reasonable. No remedy is apt for every situation, however, which
is no less true for the use of armed force than it is for non-forcible remedies.
Armed force may be used to deter environmental damage during armed conflict in a
variety of ways. They include monitoring, patrolling, clean-up, and logistical support406
Monitoring may be done through existing intelligence-gathering capability including space-based
and aerial reconnaissance. Patrolling, clean-up, and logistical support may be performed during
active hostilities as circumstances may allow and also in connection with peacekeeping
activities.407
The U.S. Armed Forces and those of many other nations have been engaged in numerous
peacekeeping operations408 around the globe. This trend should not only continue but expand, if
the assertiveness of the United Nations in the Gulf War and Bosnia-Herzegovina are any
indication. Typical of peacekeeping operations, the peacekeeping contingent is small,
multinational, and lightly armed. Its posture is passive, its positions largely static, and its
operational orders and rules of engagement emphasize self-restraint. In short, the contingent is
406
Croft, supra note 393, at 14.
.107"*u
'For example, the presence of U.S. forces involved in clean-up operations may deter an unlawful aggressor from
further environmental damage. Attack upon the U.S. forces would risk unwise escalation. By participating in the
clean-up the U.S. demonstrates its resolve to preclude further unjustified environmental damage. Another benefit
of "greenkeeping" is that the presence of neutral forces whose mission includes environmental protection may
diminish the prospects of conflict over access to what unspoiled natural resources remain.
40
°Note the distinction between passive and active peacekeeping. In the former case, largely one of monitoring
and reporting, the role of the peacekeepers is very limited and, correspondingly, the size and composition of the
force is small and defensive only. In the latter case, the size and composition of the force is larger and includes
offensive capability as might be necessary to ensure that prescribed humanitarian functions could be carried out. In
either case the objective and the mission are political (vice military) and conflict avoidance supplants confrontation
as the mode of operations.
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typically not capable of responding with force to instances serious environmental damage by
another belligerent force.
Consistent with its peacekeeping mandate, however, a peacekeeping contingent can play a
credible role by monitoring and reporting environmental damage. Grave breaches of the law
pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict should be among the matters to be
monitored and reported.409 Adverse publicity and condemnation may be useful in deterring and
stopping widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage, as they have been with some
violations of international law such as human rights abuses. When the contingent does possess
sufficient capability and capacity to employ force against the perpetrator, then force (tailored to
the military and political circumstances) should be used to deter and, if necessary, prevent, and
punish grave breaches.
"Greenkeeping" may be used to describe the active or passive use of armed forces to
protect the environment from widespread, long-term, and severe environmental harm during
armed conflict. In some respects the environmental equivalent of peacekeeping, "greenkeeping" is
a short-hand, if somewhat sloganeer, means of describing a new role for armed forces, one for
which the U.S. Armed Forces are especially well-suited and are partly prepared and equipped.
For example, the services are already versed in the handling of hazardous wastes and in pollution
abatement.410
"Greenkeeping" looks to a future in which the scale of armed conflict may be lower than in
the World Wars of this century but the adverse impact on the environment may be
disproportionately greater not because of any single conflict alone but because of the compound
and cumulative effect of environmental degradation throughout the Industrial Age.
"Greenkeeping" builds on the "precautionary principle"411 and on the principles of limitation and
409See supra part V.B.2.
41 See, e.g., Navy Environmental Manual, supra note 170, chs. 10, 19 (Oil and Hazardous Substances
Contingency Planning, Environmental Compliance Afloat).
41 Mickey & Walker, supra note 1 14, at 426-29.
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cooperation. "Greenkeeping" recognizes the intricate interdependence of the environmental
security of the international community and mutual dependence on our common environment.
2. Prevention.
In this section we will look at pre-emption and intervention. The principle of anticipatory
self-defense412 does not require that an imminent, hostile attack be absorbed, rather it may be pre-
empted and the reasonably foreseeable harm therefrom prevented. Similarly, grave breaches of
the law pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict should be pre-empted, and
unjustified environmental damage thereby prevented, when it can be done consistent with lawful
self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. To suffer the environment to absorb
irreversible damage for no lawful purpose is itself patently unwise and unjustified.
Thus, pre-emption of an attack intended to cause an eruption of the active volcano near
the NATO southern headquarters outside Naples, Italy, for example, would undoubtedly be
legally justified as a reasonable exercise of anticipatory self-defense. 413 Pre-emption would apply
not only in this type of situation but also to an on-going conflict. Pre-emption may also be a basis
for intervention.
Use of military force to protect the environment depends mainly on two factors: the
potential for conflict and the degree of impact on the environment.414 As the degree of impact on
the environment and the potential for conflict increase, so does the justification for the use of
armed force.415 This calculus should be added to the factors considered when deciding to use
force.416
412
Leibler, supra note 6, at 95-96.
413
In this situation, the justification for the use of force to prevent environmental damage overlaps the justification
for protection of the military target (AFSOUTH headquarters).
414
Croft, supra note 393, at 17-18.
415M at 17-19. Potential for conflict depends on proximity, the identity of the affected parties, and intent
(accidental v. intentional acts). Degree of impact depends on duration, the nature of the impact, and extent of
mortality. Thus, where the potential for conflict and degree of impact are slight, monitoring only would be
appropriate. When these factors increase, diplomacy may become appropriate. When these factors reach high
levels, military intervention may be required.
41
°These factors, known collectively as the "Weinberger Doctrine," are intended to ensure that force is used only
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States are reluctant to intervene unilaterally.417 As a practical matter, states rarely
intervene in armed conflicts without the imprimatur of the United Nations or of a regional
collective security body such as NATO, unless by invitation of one of the parties (where a credible
case can be made for the exercise of self-defense) or, in the case of the United States, by
operation of a hemispheric zone of influence, i.e., the Monroe Doctrine. So, for example, when
the United States intervened to halt Iraqi aggression against Kuwait it did so by invitation of
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, under the auspices of the United Nations, and in concert with a broad-
based coalition. Forward-thinking states know that environmental security and protection of the
global environment during armed conflict require cooperation.418
Had Iraq done no more than set bordering oil wells afire and released a massive oil spill
into the Persian Gulf, would intervention have been warranted solely to punish unjustified
environmental damage? And what of the use of chemical weapons in the 1980's in the Iran-Iraq
War and in Afghanistan? Surely the widespread use of long-lasting toxins which caused untold
deaths and injuries was sufficiently severe for intervention.419 And what about environmental
damage during internal conflicts such as those in Somalia and Rwanda? Legal justification
notwithstanding, how could an American president convince the American public in any of these
cases ofthe need to give American lives in the defense of remote ecosystems?420
when it is the national interest to do so and only for militarily achievable objectives. "(T)he 'just war doctrine'
modernized by former Secretary of Defense Weinberger . . . [provides] moral content to the decisions to commit
United States military forces abroad." Almond, supra note 246, at 1 1.
41
'A "lone avenger" may contribute more to international chaos than alleviate it. See Weil, supra note 92, at 433
("In the absence of any judicial channels organized to that end, . . . any state, in the name of higher values as
determined by itself, could appoint itself the avenger of the international community. Thus, under the banner of
law. chaos and violence would come to reign among states, and international law would turn on and rend itself
with the loftiest of intentions.").
l
°See Carol A. Petsonk, Recent Developments In International Organizations, 5 Am. U.J. IntlL. & PoL'V 351,
351-52 (1990) ("(E)nvironmental stability [read "security"?] requires cooperation."); accord Almond, supra note
246, at 8-9. See also World Heritage Convention of 1972 art. VI. 1 cited in Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, Cultural Norms, War and the Environment app. 2 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1 988) ("The
States Parties to this Convention recognize that [the natural heritage] constitutes a world heritage for whose
protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate.")
This points up the significance of environmental science to legal analysis. Harvard Law Review, supra note
100, at 1529-31.
420This illustrates why the power to intervene must remain permissive, not obligatory. Obligator}' intervention not
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If it is unlawful to target the environment intentionally, it is hard to imagine a case of
unjustified environmental damage that did not already implicate the prohibition against aggressive
war, itself a basis for intervention, as illustrated in the discussion of pre-emption above. As
measured by state practice, the affirmative obligation to punish grave breaches under the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Protocol I notwithstanding,421 a right of intervention does not equate to
a compulsion to intervene. Whether intervention is compulsory or discretionary its justification
flows from the right of self-defense under the law of armed conflict. A time may come, most
easily illustrated by the use of nuclear or biological weapons of mass destruction, that a neutral
state, fearing spill-over of the resulting environmental harm (even when the harmful release occurs
at long distances) may feel compelled to intervene to prevent or stop such releases from occurring
or spreading. One need only recall the far-reaching effects of Chernobyl and the Gulf War.
3. Punishment.
As a combatant, the United States may respond in force to unjustified environmental
damage by way of reprisal, not against the environment, but rather against the forces responsible
for the grave breach.422 For example, were oil or other substances hazardous to human health423
employed in a hostile manner in a theater of operations without justification, military action may
be taken to disable or destroy the enemy forces responsible. This form of punishment is addressed
not only to the instant damage but also to the enemy's capability and capacity for future
environmental damage.
only increases the danger from a "lone avenger." it also risks the exhaustion of those states with the capability to do
so which carries the attendant risk of loss of popular support and governmental resolve for environmental
protection.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 270, art. 147; and see supra note 322 and accompanying text. N.B.
Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter it is the Security Council, not individual states, which is empowered to take
"action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." U.N. Charter arts.
39-51.
422
Protocol I. supra note 271, art. 55.2.
423See, e.g., CERCLA, supra note 123, § 101(14); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) ("hazardous substance" defined).
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To respond by force in every instance of unjustified environmental damage (intentional or
reasonably foreseeable) is unnecessary and may be unwise; armed force is not the only
enforcement mechanism. Military action is a final option, not the first resort. It should be
rejected as a viable option when it is strategically, operationally, or tactically unsound and does
not serve the purposes of environmental protection. Similarly, states cannot be expected to use
armed forces to deter, prevent, or punish unjustified environmental damage when to do so would
expose its forces to unacceptable risk.
Part VII
Conclusion
As the Cold War gives way to the global village, our
leadership is needed more than ever because problems that start
beyond our borders can quickly become problems within them^
Who could doubt the need to protect the environment from the ravages of war? Anyone
who has witnessed the ruin wrought by war cannot help but cry out for the protection of the
environment from such calamity. A sure conviction grows from the personal experience of
wartime devastation that humankind, along with the Earth's other inhabitants and the environment
that we share, are certain casualties if the delicate balances of nature are bent to breaking 425
Do We Need A Concention Relative to Protection Of The Environment During Armed Conflict?
As we have seen, war is inherently destructive to the environment. Weapons of mass
destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), conventional weapons ("smart" and "dumb"), and
hostile environmental modification (an ancient but still mostly ineffectual means of warfare)
continue to be threats to the environment during armed conflict. Disturbingly, environmental
474
"^"Tresident William Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Deployment of U.S. Peacekeeping Forces to Bosnia
(Nov. 27, 1995), in Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1995, at A8 (transcript also available from Federal Document Clearing
House).
s
In order to limit cross-references, this part of the paper has been divided into sections, one each for parts II
through VI. The reader should refer back to those parts for support for die conclusions stated in this part.
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destruction during armed conflict is increasing, as may be the toleration for it. Armed conflict is
reaching the point of threatening the Earth's carrying capacity, that is, the Earth's ability to sustain
human life.
So great are the risks from warfare, protection of the environment from unjustified
environmental damage during armed conflict has become a matter of human survival. The
developing right to a safe environment and its corollary, intergenerational equity, should be
recognized and accepted as customary international law.426 Protection of the environment needs
a status commensurate with its importance to us all. International law must establish its
normative base, it must recognize the fundamental rights that give substance to environmental
protection.
The new treaty approach would in the long run provide the best protection for the
environment during armed conflict. The problems of environmental protection during armed
conflict are complex, often technical and scientific, and thus unsuited to the generalities of
customary international law 427 Additionally, legitimate self-defense requirements are often
squarely opposed to environmental considerations. Legal solutions to this dilemma will therefore
require an interdisciplinary perspective, a perspective reflective of the interdependence of
humanitarian and environmental rights and of the dependence of the international community on
our shared environment.
A convention-protocol process would be one way, first, to bring needed recognition to the
right to a safe environment and intergenerational equity, second, to address the difficult issues
associated with establishing a practical threshold for unjustified environmental damage, and third,
42
"C/f "Using the 'right to environment' approach to incorporate environmental law into the law of war, however,
presents several difficulties. First, the link between a right to environment and a right to life has not been accepted
as customary international law. Second, deciding which environmental conventions are embraced by the right to
environment would be difficult since the substantive boundaries of the right to environment remain undefined.
Third, this approach is human-centered in that it focuses on the value of the environment as a human habitat."
Simonds, supra note 8, at 189-90.
L See Almond, supra note 246, at 5 ("(D)ecision and policy makers . . . often lack the scientific skills and
knowledge about the problems that concern them").
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to define the operative terms "widespread, long-term, and severe." This process, building on
Protocol I and the ENMOD Treaty, should codify and clarify the protections to be given to the
environment during armed conflict. Additionally, this process could provide enforcement
mechanisms to the United Nations and to individual states to prosecute war crimes and obtain
reparations for environmental damages. Further, the rights and responsibilities of armed forces
relative to environmental protection during armed conflict could be prescribed. Unlike the Fifth
Geneva Convention proposed by Greenpeace International essential military capability and
flexibility must be maintained, although some constriction of "essential" may be in order.
The work of preparing a convention relative to protection of the environment during
armed conflict properly belongs with the International Law Commission (ILC). While the ILC is
only one of several alternative hosts for the preparatory work necessary for new convention, and
may even be one of the slowest-working,428 it is the most preferable precisely because of its
United Nations affiliation.429 Environmental protection during armed conflict is a subject that
must be addressed by the U.N due to its inseparable connections to basic human rights,
international peace, and security. The U.N. is the "key forum."430 The ILC should act before the
end of the current United Nations Decade of International Law.
Making new law is not always the best solution to an existing problem, however. It is
equally important to consider ways to improve the application and enforcement of existing law.
Improvements in these areas may obviate the need for new law.
Are We Likely To Achieve Such A Convention In The Foreseeable Future?
The prospects for achieving a new convention that protects the environment during armed
conflict in the foreseeable future are dim. At present, there are no sponsors capable of bringing
**
"^Existing and developing customary- and conventional law and the new environmental ethic in national security,
foreign policy, and military manuals provide a creditable stop-gap that will allow adequate time for the laborious
and politically-contentious work of hammering-out a comprehensive new text.
*^See Helmut Turk, The Negotiation ofa New Geneva-Style Convention: A Government Lawyer's Perspective, in
Environmental Protection and the Law of War 100-102 (Glen Plant ed., 1992).
430See Plant, supra note 140, at 173-77.
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such an initiative to fruition and this situation is unlikely to change. This state of affairs does not
invalidate the arguments for a multilateral convention, but strategies for development and
enforcement of the law must be constructed within this present reality.
The alternative favored by the United Nations, the United States, and the ICRC, as well as
most academics - the guidelines approach - will undoubtedly help to institutionalize an
environmental ethic among armed forces in peacetime; the United States has begun to embrace a
sympathetic posture for its armed forces as evidenced by The Commander's Handbook on the
Law ofNaval Operations provisions on targeting. Environmental protection guidelines should be
translated into doctrine where they will do the most good toward inculcating environmental
protection into the way armed forces fight. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider doctrinal
implications when formulating new environmental guidance for all U.S. Armed Forces.
The guidelines approach has several limitations. Guidelines are binding unilaterally only.
Bindingness on the international plain depends on the applicability of the sources of international
law from which the guidelines were drawn. Guidelines drawn on a pick-and-choose basis and
which rely too heavily on untested environmental gloss will do little to provide the environment
adequate protection against unjustified damage during armed conflict. Neither will they provide
an authoritative source for effective enforcement of the law pertaining to environmental
protection during armed conflict.
How Can The Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict
Be Advanced In The Meantime?
Customary international law, properly developed, is strong, especially those nonderogable
norms that fall within the ambit oijus cogens. Some view a number of the protections pertaining
to the environment during armed conflict as being both customary international law and jus




Relative normativity is a pitfall to be avoided. The better view is that all accepted norms
create binding and enforceable obligations. The lack ofjus cogens status does not prevent a norm
from imposing state responsibility.
Care should be exercised in the formation of customary norms not to over-emphasize
opinio juris to the exclusion of state practice, even in matters of jus cogens. State practice
remains an indispensable element in the making of customary international law. The fact that
existing law may be interpreted to provide certain protections to the environment during armed
conflict does not mean that state practice has yet begun to adhere to this interpretation.
The guidelines approach aids in the law-making process. Not only are military manuals
evidence of opinio juris, they play a critical role in shaping the conduct of military operations.
Military operations are the most important evidence of state practice during armed conflict itself.
The law pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict must continue to
develop progressively. Despite the problems of ambiguity associated with several of the most
fundamental concepts - the definition of "environment," the Protocol I standard of "widespread,
long-term and severe," and the right to a safe environment, for example - the "scrupulous"
observance called for by the ICRC and others will in time provide greater clarity and certainty.
For its part, the United States should be sensitive to its tendency to chauvinize international law.
Inadequate enforcement is the weakest link in the area of environmental protection during
armed conflict. There are no effective judicial remedies available to hold states or individuals
accountable for unjustified environmental damage. War crimes prosecutions are virtually
unknown. War reparations have fallen largely into disuse. States lack resolve to seek more than
occasional "victor's justice" due to uncertainty in the law and to the desire to preserve sovereign
prerogatives.
Effective enforcement requires the means and the commitment to deter, prevent, and
punish unjustified environmental damage during armed conflict. Each of these three elements
contribute to a strategy of control based on the same principle of limitation as pertains in the law
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of armed conflict. The most important restraint is deterrence of the use offeree by a prospective
belligerent.
Preventative remedies are especially important to environmental protection during armed
conflict. Irreversible and irreparable environmental damage can have catastrophic consequences.
A complete understanding of the effects of environmental destruction remains beyond our
knowledge of the environment. The precautionary principle must be applied to further the
conservation imperative. Post-delictual remedies simply cannot meet this need.
What Is The Existing Law Relative To Protection Of The Environment During Armed Conflict?
The protections pertaining to the environment during armed conflict may be found in the
law of armed conflict, in modern humanitarian law conventions, and in international environmental
law. 431 The law pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict is a newly formed,
developing body of law, if indeed one may call it that, which was given shape, largely by
extrapolation, as a result of the intense scrutiny brought to bear in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
The applicability of this body of law varies with the nature of the obligation (customary or
conventional) and by the state concerned.
The most important elements of the law of armed conflict are the principle of military
necessity and the Martens Clause contained in the Hague Regulations and repeated in Protocol I.
Military necessity is the primary principle underlying the legitimate use of force; however, the
431
"(X)here is presently [sic] in existence today a wide range of international/regional treaties or agreements
which express a solemn conviction or intention of civilized nations of the world to secure the atmosphere, oceans,
and lands constituting the planetary environment from the destructive consequences of war or any other militaristic
activities. An international customary law of environmental warfare can no doubt be discernible from these
treaties, sufficiently well enough to support a legal assertion that the international community resolutely denounces
environmental warfare and accordingly there is a legal obligation on the world nations not to resort to
environmental warfare, whether or not they have consented to these treaties or agreements from which these
international customary rules are deduced." Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 197. These treaties and
agreements include the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1925 Gas Convention,
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
and Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1971 Sea Bed
Treaty, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1977 ENMOD Treaty and Protocol I, the 1979 Moon
Agreement, and the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Id. at 188-96.
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principle is criticized for its overuse as a justification for environmental damage and because it
does little to deter or prevent environmental damage. The principles of military necessity,
humanity, and environmental protection are complimentary. 432 They share a common value
system. 433 To the extent that they are incomplete in themselves, they are the "source" for more
precise rules governing belligerent practices involving the environment.434 The Martens Clause
remains important, despite the criticism that the Hague Regulations are themselves obsolete,
because, through the "law of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience,"435 it extends the
law of armed conflict to states that have failed to accede to recent developments in treaty law.
Relevant humanitarian law includes the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I.
Environmental protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention, like the law of armed conflict,
are property-based; they were not developed with the environment in mind. Protocol I makes the
largest and most direct contribution. It's "widespread, long-term and severe" standard is already
binding on the majority of states (not including the United States) but may not apply to non-
international armed conflict or armed conflict in the air or at sea which is not related to armed
conflict on land. Some violations of the environmental protections in Protocol I would constitute
grave breaches, but many, perhaps most, would not.
As we have observed, the United States' objections to Protocol I have for the most part
been overtaken by events. It would be appropriate for the U.S. to re-evaluate its position vis-a-
vis ratification. The "widespread, long-term and severe" standard plays a prominent role in the
ICRC "Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in
Times of Armed Conflict." In the absence of a new treaty, Protocol I, along with the principle of
military necessity, will be the foundation on which the law pertaining to environmental protection
during armed conflict will continue to build.
-^Almond, supra note 34, at 125; Almond, supra note 43, at 335.
"*J
J
Caggiano, supra note 2, at 484.
434Almond, supra note 43, at 333, 335.
3 See supra part V.A.2.
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Relevant norms of international environmental law are also essential elements of this body
of law, the doctrine of state responsibility chief among them. This doctrine imposes liability on a
state for its actions which result in harm to another state and applies during armed conflict A
state guilty of unlawful aggression, including the waging of environmental warfare, will be
responsible for any unjustified environmental damage which results. Self-defense, even lawful
self-defense,436 may not be an absolute bar to such liability.
Three "soft" law texts also make significant contributions: the Stockholm and Rio
Declarations and the World Charter for Nature. The Stockholm Declaration gave first voice to
the concern over the environmental consequences of mass destruction. Ten years later, the World
Charter for Nature added additional support to the proposition that environmental damage during
armed conflict should be avoided. Ten years after that, the Rio Declaration reminded states of
their obligation to protect the environment during armed conflict. These texts, the Rio
Declaration in particular, are criticized for their potential for overwhelming liability for
environmental damage regardless of the justification therefor under the law of armed conflict.
The ENMOD Treaty, which prohibits the hostile use of certain environmental modification
techniques, does not as such protect the environment against damage during armed conflict. The
ENMOD Treaty is criticized for its superfluousness to modern armed conflict, viz., that it
prohibits only that which is already unattractive militarily. The treaty definitions of "widespread,
long-lasting or severe" are persuasive authority for the interpretation of the Protocol I standard of
"widespread, long-term and severe."
How Can Existing Law Be Strengthened And Enforced?
The restrained use of armed force can be an effective mechanism for enforcing the existing
law pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict. The U.S. Armed Forces have
*+JOEven an unlawful aggressor may exercise self-defense in response to armed force. The fact that the aggression
was unlawful does not divest the aggressor of the belligerent right of self-defense under the law of armed conflict.
See Neff, supra note 35, at 2-3.
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assimilated an environmental ethic; environmental security is now a prominent feature of United
States foreign policy. The use of restrained armed force is a preventative remedy that can be
tailored to meet the exigencies of a situation that arises within a theater of operations. Moreover,
the restrained use of armed force can meet all of the objectives of effective enforcement -
deterrence, prevention, and punishment. Care must be taken to ensure that the nature and extent
of the environmental harm exceeds the threshold over which the use of armed force can be
justified.
This is why the Protocol I standard is important. It provides a threshold which separates
justified from unjustified environmental damage. In conjunction with the law of armed conflict,
other humanitarian law, and international environmental law, the Protocol I standard can fill the
void that now exists in the law pertaining to environmental protection during armed conflict.
Admittedly, this standard needs further refinement before it will reach a level of clarity that will
provide meaningful direction to military commanders and to states, but this is the point and
purpose of state practice. As we have noted, the ENMOD Treaty definitions may be used as an
aid in interpreting key terms.
Armed forces may be used in a peacekeeping context, which we referred to as
"greenkeeping," for such activities as monitoring, reporting, clean-up, and logistical support. This
deters environmental damage. During armed conflict, armed forces may also be used to pre-empt
environmental damage or to intervene in an on-going conflict to stop environmental damage. This
serves prevention, although care must be taken to preclude the encouragement of a "lone
avenger." Additionally, armed force may also be used during armed conflict to disable or destroy
enemy forces responsible for unjustified environmental damage. This punishes serious violations
(grave breaches) of international law occurring in combat. These uses of force help to internalize




Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits aggressive war.437 In its place was
erected a system of collective security overseen by the Security Council which under Chapter VII
of the Charter is empowered to take action to redress threats to international peace and security
including those arising from environmental warfare.438 The collective security concept, however,
has not prevented wars, neither has it placed any appreciable restraints on the destructiveness
unleashed on the environment.439 These two phenomena - destructiveness and self-restraint - are
at odds with one another, a tension with which any enforcement mechanism must deal 440
The near universal but abstract condemnation of unjustified environmental destruction
during armed conflict must be made real. 441 The fight to save the planet from the devastating
effects of environmental warfare is not won, it is just beginning. The United States should make
environmental protection during armed conflict a centerpiece of its military doctrine and continue
to work assiduously to find long-term legal solutions under international law 442
43
U. N. Charter art. 2 f[ 4; and see generally Neff, supra note 35.
438Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 215-17.
"*J
'Almond, supra note 43, at 309.
440M at 310-13.
Caggiano, supra note 2, at 504.
442See id. at 506. But cf. Almond, supra note 246, at 21-22 ("(T)here are limits upon what the United States can
achieve with its own resources, or even when it attempts coalitions with other states. It is a truism that the United
States should not commit funds or assume undertakings unless, in doing so, it foresees that it can modify, reverse,
or block environmental harm or damage, or unless it is compelled to react to crises or emergencies that may affect
it severely.").
86
J?




